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by Raymond Apthorpe

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NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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Editor's Notes

"The consequence of individual life without mutual aid is poverty; the consequence of corporate life without recognition of individual rights is strife. Poverty means anxiety; strife spells misfortune. In order to relieve anxiety and eradicate strife, nothing is as effective as the institution of corporate life based on a clear recognition of individual rights". (Hsun-tzu, 3rd Century BC).

Can Co-operatives today offer the mutual aid and corporate life advocated so long ago in ancient China? In the present era of newly independent nations the ready panacea often advocated for the ills and poverty of the rural peasantry has been the establishment of Co-operatives. Donors and recipients of aid alike, academics and administrators, national and international officials have all tended to believe that the formation of Co-operatives could solve a wide spectrum of social and economic problems. Now in the Second Development Decade (DD2) there are doubts and some degree of disillusion. In this Number Raymond Apthorpe assesses the situation in East Africa where the story of the Co-operative Movement tells of several outstanding successes offset by many failures. The whys and wherefores are set out and the controversy that may be stimulated in consequence should do more good than attempts to paper over the cracks. Nonetheless it is as well to mention that the author omits some important objectives of Co-operatives (e.g. encouragement of local savings, provision of marketing machinery, etc.) and it is scarcely fair to compare new Co-operatives in the Third World with those in Britain in the Nineteen Sixties.

The problems of Co-operatives are followed up in a major Review-article by Guy Hunter who sees some hope in the increasingly important joint role of sociologist, political scientist and public administrator in loosening the economists' stranglehold on Planning departments. Rather more than Raymond Apthorpe, Guy Hunter sees a great need for social concepts to be given equal weight with those of economics. He believes an excessive tendency by administrators to manage and shape society rather than to facilitate its growth has, up till now, inhibited the successful development of Co-operative movements.

Associated, too, with mutual aid for the peasant farmer, is J. R. Nellis' study of the "transformation" stage in the evolution, maybe revolution, in Tanzanian peasant agriculture from traditional peasant holdings to the "Jamaa" villages which John Connell will discuss in our next issue.

Relevant to these problems and of interest we hope to our readers, is the recent setting up of a new department of Social Affairs in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), where this Journal is produced and where responsibilities have been assumed for subjects lying within the social sector – *inter alia* these will include urban growth and rural development, co-operatives, social security and social defence. We intend to continue our present policy of covering as widely as possible the varied aspects and problems of administration in developing countries. At the same time we hope that future Numbers may see somewhat greater attention paid to the social facets of administration overseas.

This Number is largely devoted to African problems. Dr. Ouko tells of the establishment and objectives of the African Association for Public Administration and Management of which he is the first President and which all whose interests lie in efficient administration in Africa will wish well, while E. K. Ragui describes the present day role of the district officer in Kenya. Some may find the role as described by Ragui rather too "traditional" and the author seemingly somewhat nostalgic about the old time D.C. Certainly the varying forms of administration followed by East and Central African governments offer plenty of scope for comparative study, and will doubtless prove a source for many a future political science thesis.

Finally Dr. Datta outlines the facilities that have been made available for the training of senior personnel of Indian municipalities. He emphasizes in particular the need for active support and confidence from Union and State governments, so essential for the activities of the Indian Institute of Public Administration.

The African Association for Public Administration and Management

By ROBERT OUKO

Dr. Ouko, a Kenyan, is Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs in the East African Community.

The African Association for Public Administration and Management* is a product of the Intra-African Public Administration seminar which began in 1962 as an informal colloquium of selected senior officers from some of the English-speaking countries of East and West Africa. The purpose of the seminar series has been and remains that of providing an opportunity for practising administrators to improve their knowledge and experience in the examination of practical problems in the administration of public services in the English-speaking African countries.

The seminars provide a forum for frank and friendly exchange of views among senior administrators from Anglophone Africa, and have proved to be of considerable value and popularity. For the first three years the seminars were quite informal. No papers were presented, although brief notes were prepared to guide the discussions. Participants spoke about the practical problems they were experiencing in their own circumstances, and listened with interest to similar experiences elsewhere.

In 1965 the meetings became officially known as the Intra-African Public Administration Seminars. Attendance has steadily increased from year to year, with applications constantly in excess of places at the seminars. The quality of participants has also remained high. More recently the seminars have been attended by Ministers responsible for civil service matters, civil service Heads, chairmen of public service commissions, and directors of institutes of public administration, in addition to permanent secretaries and professional officers of similar standing. Also, the number of English-speaking African countries seeking to host the seminars has been increasing. For example, at the 1970 seminar in Botswana, there were bids from three African States to play host to the 10th Seminar, which took place in Freetown, Sierra Leone last November. Previous seminars were held in Tanzania (1962), Nigeria (1963), Uganda (1964), Zambia (1965), Egypt (1966), Ghana (1967), Kenya (1968), Liberia (1969) and Botswana (1970).

Up to now, the seminars have been organized and financed largely by the Ford Foundation, which has shared in the cost of the seminars with each of the countries that have stood host at the meetings. They have done this by shouldering the responsibility for international travel, hotel expenses, the cost of producing preparatory papers, and the printing of the final report, while the host countries have met the cost of internal transport and other expenses. In particular, the Association owes a great deal to the untiring efforts of Mr. David Anderson of the Ford Foundation, who has planned and directed all the ten seminars.

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* At the inauguration of this Association in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 4th November, 1971, the author was elected first President of the Association. This article is adapted from his inaugural address.

A number of international organizations operating in Africa have observer status at our Seminars. These include the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) in Dakar, the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) in Tangier, and the Commonwealth Secretariat in London.

At the ninth seminar at Gaborone, Botswana, the meeting reaffirmed its belief in the value of this seminar series not only as a forum for discussing in depth current problems in African countries but also as a means of establishing a foundation for regional co-operation, and recommended the formation of an Association of professional administrators and managers, with the aim of promoting through relevant research the improvement of the theory and practice of administration and management in Africa so as to help accelerate economic and social development. The fulfilment of this objective found expression in the inauguration in Sierra Leone in November 1971, of the African Association for Public Administration and Management, which has henceforth taken over the organization of the seminars.

It has been decided that to begin with membership of the Association should be restricted to individuals who have made a significant contribution towards the progress of African administration and management and a list of those already enrolled as members is attached as Appendix I. The list of institutions enrolled as corporate members is at Appendix II, while Appendix III contains the names of the prominent African administrators and managers selected by the Gaborone Seminar to found the Association. Twelve of these gentlemen met in Nairobi in March 1971 and drew up the draft constitution and draft rules which were adopted at subsequent meetings, where it was also agreed that the formal launching of the Association should take place in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the Intra-African Public Administration Seminar series.

The effort which we seek to make through this Association to improve the theory and practice of public administration in Africa is in no way an isolated one. It is part of the overall global strategy for development. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly resolution of the international development strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade has many implications for public administration, particularly in the developing world. For example, it requests developing countries to "pay special attention to the orientation and organization of their public administration at all levels for both the effective formulation and implementation of their development plans . . . ".

It will of course be remembered that development does involve not only economic and social change. It also concerns the transformation of whole societies. Public administration must therefore play its role as an effective instrument for managing this process of transformation. Since development is a continuous process, efforts to improve administrative capability must also be continuous. The fact that demands are continually rising imposes obligations on management that cannot be taken lightly. Management must be dynamic and responsive to these demands if it is to cope effectively with the increasing administrative load imposed by change.

Yet in all developing countries the rate of development remains below expectation. The role of our developing governments as the prime movers of economic and social development obliges them to maintain and improve upon their administrative capability. There is need to measure this capability and to continuously identify and adopt the means of increasing it. Administrative capability can be increased quantitatively by measuring the supply of good administrators, and qualitatively by improving the quality of the tools and techniques which they use.

There has been much talk about the strategic importance of public administration in the economic and social development of societies. As far back as 1948 the United Nations General Assembly identified the lack of expert personnel and lack of technical organization as being among the factors which impede the economic development of the under-developed areas.[1] Seventeen years later, i.e. on December 4th, 1965, the General Assembly again expressed the conviction "that in order to hasten the economic and social progress of the developing countries it is necessary to intensify measures for the full utilization of human resources and especially for the training of national personnel . . . ". Also, at about the same time as the first Intra-African Public Administration Seminar was taking place in 1962, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations was passing a resolution urging member governments to include in their development plans targets for the provision of qualified administrators, and to place special emphasis on training in public administration.[2]

This strategic importance of public administration has similarly been articulated on many occasions by the Economic Commission for Africa itself, notably in its resolution of February 27th, 1965 in which it noted "the special importance of public administration in the formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes for African countries".[3] The Economic Commission for Africa has also rightly expressed the conviction that "the African states can help one another in the field of public administration". One can find similar statements in almost all the reports of national, regional and international conferences which have had a bearing on the various aspects of public administration.

Yet, in spite of all these pronouncements, not enough attention has been paid in the past by developing countries to investment in administrative capability. For example, not all their development plans include components specifically dealing with investment in major administrative reforms to improve the quality of management, or in an overall transformation of administrative systems, although of course there exist examples of serious efforts in this direction, of which the Ndegwa Report in Kenya is one of the latest and most outstanding.[4] How and why this inadequacy has occurred in the past is of relative unimportance. What is important for us as an Association of professional administrators and managers is how to highlight, honestly, intelligently, and practically, factors which will make such inclusion imperative.

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[1] General assembly Resolution No. 200 (iii) of December 4th, 1968.
[2] ECOSOC Resolution No. 907 (xxxiv) of August 2nd, 1962.
[3] ECA Resolution No. 124 (vii) of February 27th, 1965.

As far as the overhauling of administrative systems is concerned it can be said that we in developing Africa have spent the most part of the last decade mainly identifying our needs and requirements; spelling out what needs to be done. We have heard it said time and time again that since the colonial system of administration was geared towards the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes, it is manifestly unsuited for the task of national development which has become the number one domestic imperative since independence. We have also heard it stated that the rules and regulations operative in the colonial days were aimed basically at eliciting obedience and ensuring subservience. Similarly, we have read considerable literature about the need to change the civil service structures to adapt them to the objectives of national development.

One could go on and on about what we have considered should be removed, done or changed. Yet how far we have succeeded in actually removing, doing or changing these things remains a matter of debate. There is no simple answer for Africa as a whole, as circumstances differ from one country to another. There are definitely areas where considerable advance has been made, more so in some countries and less so in others. Obviously, some administrative reform of one kind or another has taken place in all African countries. The literature available tends to show, however, that these have been sporadic and piece-meal. It is not clear what impact these reforms have had on the totality of management systems in our states. What seems certain is that in spite of all the good work and the efforts that have been made in the last decade, a lot still remains to be done. As Dr. Robert Gardiner, a founder member of this Association, has warned, the substance of the colonial tradition has disappeared but the form lingers on in many administration practices. Many of Africa's problems will have to be solved largely by herself, and the international community has called upon the less developed countries of the world to carry themselves as far as possible in the field of promoting development. It is in this spirit that the African Association for Public Administration and Management has been established and launched. The Association seeks to foster the professionalization of public administration and management in Africa, and particularly to develop through research and comparative studies an increasing appreciation of the value and importance of public administration and management. We also seek to promote the adoption of more effective and adequate administrative and management systems and practices, and to foster affiliation and maintain liaison with international bodies and organizations interested in the progress of public administration and management.

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[4] *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* (Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission) 1970–71, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1971.

We hope to be able to achieve these aims in a number of ways, operating where appropriate through, or in collaboration with, African and other institutions with similar objectives. Firstly, by establishing standing committees in research and documentation on special problems related to administrative and management practices. Secondly, by organizing training seminars, short courses and conferences on specific issues. Thirdly, by distributing and exchanging documents and by publishing research and occasional papers in our own journal for promoting the development of administrative and management science in Africa. Fourthly, by providing consultancy services to professional training centres, governments and bodies interested in the progress of African administration and management. Lastly but by no means least, by promoting inter-country schemes of exchange of public servants and managers. Although this Association does not at present cover the French-speaking African countries, we expect to be able to maintain close liaison with them in our efforts, from which we hope they will benefit as well. For example, a decision has already been taken to translate into French the reports of all the past ten seminars for distribution to French-speaking African countries.

Gratitude has already been expressed to the Ford Foundation for the generous financial and other support which they have given towards the organization of the seminars during the last ten years, and we shall continue gratefully to acknowledge similar assistance from governments and international institutions which have an interest in the development of management practice in Africa, but we realise that however much support we receive from sources external to Africa, the major burden must be borne by us. We seek external support only as a means towards self-reliance in this field, as in others. This will obviously call for concerted action and complete dedication to the objectives which this Association seeks to achieve. It is our commitment to these objectives and to their fulfilment that has led to the formation of this Association.

Co-operatives in Rural Africa

By RAYMOND APTHORPE

Professor Apthorpe served as Project Director of Africa Studies on Rural Co-operatives and Planned Change at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1969–70. He was previously a visiting Professor at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and more recently with the United Nations Development Programme Unit in Taiwan. In September, 1972 he will be taking up the directorship, International Applied Research and Studies Centre, *Institut Panafricain*, at Douala in the Cameroon Republic.

CO-OPERATIVES in many countries in Africa in recent years have come to a state of crisis. Sometimes this has had calamitous results for the ordinary members who had put their faith in them. The first task of this short overview must be to survey some of the gains and some of the losses. A number of countries have a long tradition in the affairs of their co-operatives, of applied social studies which aim to evaluate the social, economic and political performance of organizations, and to make recommendations based on the evaluations carried out. Where such a constructively critical spirit has been driven underground in a country, or has emigrated to another, the chances of peaceful rather than violent change of public policy in major sectors grow steadily less and less.

The highly selective overview that follows is based on a much more comprehensive analysis than can be documented here, one that extends to West and North Africa besides East Africa[1] which is the particular focus of interest here.

Comparative performance

In order to appraise the performance of an organization relative to its stated goals, it is necessary to choose, as headings under which summary statements can be made, the themes which are the most prominent in the policies promulgated by the organization itself. In Africa generally, and not only in its eastern group of countries, the most important objectives of co-operatives at the local level are usually stated to be: the stimulation of local initiative, agricultural innovation, the improvement of marketing facilities, more equalization of economic opportunity, the setting up of projects which could have demonstration effects, and administrative reform.

The stimulation of local initiative. In many of the communities studied there is little evidence that local initiative and self-help have been stimulated by the introduction of co-operatives. Partly this seems to be because, with few exceptions, there has been little real or shared understanding of the purposes of the policy. People may contribute their labour freely for road clearing, and for sundry public works and school construction, where they see this to be clearly in their own immediate interests. In the new situation of external contact brought about or represented by the introduction of the co-operative, however, where there seems often to be little immediate return to labour expended, or where recurrent costs are not met by the central or other authorities responsible, the evidence that increased self-help has been stimulated by co-operatives is slight. There are even some reports of decreases. As a result, in most regions, the contribution of co-operatives training centres, which are expressions of organization at a higher than the local level which is under discussion here, is exceptional yet not without problems. These, however, relate less to the production of skills than their absorption in the co-operative sector where rewards, monetary or otherwise, are not competitive with those elsewhere.

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[1] The results of new field work in East Africa has been taken into account in writing this overview. The studies referred to were undertaken by Edward Brett, Goran Hyden and Edward Karanja, Norman Long and Stephen Lombard. Their reports are published in Vol. IV of the UNRISD series "Rural institutions and planned change," *Rural co-operatives and planned change in Africa: case materials*, edited by the writer, 1970. Volume VI of that series, to be published by 1972, comprises an overview with full documentation of all the sources consulted.

On aspects of performance touched on in the present essay I have drawn in particular from discussions with my colleagues at UNRISD, mainly Mokpopo Dravi, Donald V. McGranahan the Director of the Institute, and Wolf Scott.

A truer picture of co-operatives in East Africa would draw due attention to an important historical fact. Government policy on co-operatives has been directed as much, if not more, towards the control of the co-operative movement, than towards the stimulation of Societies. The distinction between these policies may be a fine one with much depending on the point of view from which the movement in question is being examined. The fact remains, however, that co-operatives in eastern Africa were formed first of all essentially "from below", and without government aid or encouragement. In their early years in the colonial period they were distinctly associated, as had been co-operatives in Britain in the nineteenth century for example, with protest against the prevailing régime.

Agricultural innovation. In many rural regions the diffusion of agricultural improvements such as new seeds, better methods, and new implements, has taken place through co-operatives. In this regard the record of work done by these organizations is relatively positive. Often this has been at comparatively low cost to the farmer who has been helped with loans. The level of loan repayments where agricultural credit has been administered through co-operatives, however, has been generally low. This means that the costs of the operation to the societies and the external sponsoring bodies have been high. On the whole, moreover, it is doubtful whether there is conclusive evidence of any very close link between levels of credit and better farming practices and output.

Another problem for evaluation arises from the fact that, except where alternative channels have been excluded, co-operatives have not provided the only means for the diffusion of agricultural innovation, and their members are reported to continue looking to agricultural extension services for technical advice. Also, while the supplies especially of mechanical aids such as tractors and minor processing facilities may have been spread successfully by the co-operatives, commonly these have not been well adjusted to local needs.

In speaking of co-operatives here as elsewhere, in this brief review, it is chiefly to governmental organizations, i.e. organizations not in the private or religious sector that reference is made. The record of performance of co-operatives as regards rural credit supplies differs, in some regards, from sector to sector. It is not possible in the present summary to do more than simply to note the existence of this variation, however.

Marketing facilities. The evidence on this point is mixed and difficult to assess, especially where the prices received for products marketed through the co-operatives are fixed at a relatively low level. Studies from all regions of Africa show, for instance, that members of co-operatives continue to use the facilities provided by private traders for certain locally consumable foodstuffs regardless of whether this is legal or not. This is especially the case at certain times of the year, when the growers can get better prices from private trade than through the co-operatives – i.e. from the government – and without delays, deductions or debits that seem especially excessive for those with the smallest farms or the lowest output.

The evidence of many studies is that the ordinary farmers believe that the dues they pay to the societies are spent mainly for the benefit of a new class of minor officials which the co-operatives have brought into the rural areas. Between the farmers and these officials there continue to be great gulfs in social communication and identification – great gaps in social distance. This is so even in regions where political education programmes have been pursued very actively by the central government and national political parties.

Equalization of economic opportunity. Co-operatives aim to spread economic opportunities and to equalize social participation. The evidence on the extent to which these aims are achieved is not very positive and there are, in some cases, clearly negative instances. One of these relates to the disadvantages for women cultivators where the products of their labour are marketed through the co-operatives in which membership is confined to plotholders who, in most cases, are men. Another aspect of negative evidence relates to the role of those classes of people in the rural economy which are prosperous and influential reported on in recent studies, again from virtually all parts of Africa, as well as the class of small bureaucratic officials already mentioned. Co-operatives are used by local economic and social notables to entrench their already comparatively advantageous position yet further.

On a subject where evidence is difficult to come by for the simple reason that it is in the interests of those who are in possession of it to suppress or to distort it, there is, of course, much room for debate, even if the parties to this do divide on the basis of those who are for, and those who are against, the present policies of their government. Any summary opinion on the extent to which there has or has not been a democratization of economic opportunity at the local level is, therefore, likely to be biased and not easily demonstrable. The conclusion, nonetheless, to which the present study subscribes, is unequivocal. On balance at the local level there has been more reinforcement than reform of local social economic and political systems as a result of the introduction of co-operatives by governments, and thus little structural social change can be said to have resulted from this policy.

Demonstration effects. Co-operatives have not spread widely on their own account. In one East African country, for example, the only instance found of strong support for the idea of them was in a district to which they have not yet been extended. When there is no further supply of land or credit available for central government to distribute, this alone inhibits the spread of the co-operative idea. Moreover, the existing primary societies often are not anxious to admit new members even when from among local people. Many studies mention problems of enlarging a society once it has been founded – a problem which comes from within rather than from outside. Sometimes the setting-up of a co-operative can create a sense of hostility as between members and non-members where this did not exist before. All this must be taken carefully into account when assessing the notion that co-operatives are development organizations which can be expected to have demonstration effects and, for this reason, to be preferable to alternative forms of organization.

In addition there is a problem about demonstration development schemes in general. In practice they are often demonstrations simply provided for visitors, often foreign visitors, of what can be done if, on the part of central government, effort is determined and concentrated enough and no costs are spared. The schemes that are the most likely to have successful demonstration effect at the local level are those which, because they are of low cost, can be easily reproduced once their local worth is proven, regardless of how they can be shown off to visitors from without.

Administrative reform. Many studies trace deficiencies in the performances of co-operatives to failings in their administration. In general the pattern of administration that has been introduced is one which both permits and facilitates control from above and from outside the local community, and restricts the part that local self-imposed controls, sanctions and rewards, could play. This means little encouragement is given to members to learn from their mistakes while these are still small enough to be handled at the local level. Where this is the case, co-operatives as agencies designed to improve provision for local administrative capacity are prevented even from the possibility of doing this.

It is at this juncture that the wider issue of co-operatives and the rise of socialism must be mentioned. If, in another historical period and in another continent, it was the protestant ethic that facilitated the rise of capitalism, in many countries now in Africa it is the co-operative ethic that, according to central government planning, is to facilitate the rise of socialism. There are as many kinds of socialism as there are of capitalism, including national and international as well as other varieties. The socialism to which co-operatives are to give rise is, chiefly, administrative socialism limited in many ways to functional, technological and routine tasks supposedly lying far outside politics, or at least outside the politics of an opposition. In this regard there is considerable continuity rather than discontinuity in Africa in development policies as between the later colonial and the post-colonial periods. Here again, however, a brief summary statement is apt to be suggestive more of a personal point of view of the observer than of the stated points of view of the observed.

Two avenues of options for change

Next, one must consider alternative courses of action as regards recommendations which, if implemented effectively, might go some way towards remedying the foregoing problem situations. As with any kind of existing development organizations, however, so with co-operatives, there are two broad avenues each with options to be considered by any evaluative study and these must now be described.

One of these concerns mainly making administrative changes in matters of organizational detail, selecting those of course that would seem to have the most significance overall. Following this line of approach one might recommend for instance that, in adverse conditions, despite all their problems, co-operatives should not be abolished so much as restricted in some way – e.g. only to certain crops or commodities, or only to initial stages in development projects with other than co-operative forms of organization being established once certain preliminary steps have been taken such as, say, concerning the identification of local needs and priorities of which distant central planning might be totally unaware.

The second set of options extends to more drastic possibilities. The classical argument against marketing and especially production co-operatives is that, while they may have been originally designed to improve the conditions of rural life and to better the existence of poverty groups in particular, their only real effect, should they have been established with any success at all, is simply to have facilitated the rise of a new class of *petits fonctionnaires* who, it might be said, live comfortably off the misfortune of others. Except in the case of a few individuals in the locality concerned, who manage affairs to their own advantage, rural poverty remains more or less as it was before; in some areas, even, it has probably worsened.

Commonly the officials who manage or inspect co-operatives are not themselves members of these organizations. This helps give rise to many problems. They lack that experience of co-operatives from within which only members can possess. Regardless of how diligently they may apply themselves to co-operative affairs, they are not seen by local people as being closely identified with these in one of the crucial ways that matters. The personal fortunes of these small officials do not seem to rise or fall in line with those of the ordinary members of the societies they are supposed to serve. Sometimes, even, there seems to be a reverse relationship and accusations of corruption, theft and embezzlement are made which are well grounded. Evaluation of the extent of this malfeasance, however, is difficult. Public inquiries into co-operatives may have brought to light more irregularities than are publically known as regards other sectors but this does not mean, of course, that in reality these other sectors are blameless or even comparatively so.

This brief overview will limit itself simply to some issues on which recommendations could be made in the first avenue of options. Four topics in particular will be singled out, namely, membership, organizational capacity, administrative structure and short-versus long-run effects. If goals are to mean anything they must be reached. According to co-operative theory (while still remaining within only the first set of options described above) the best means to improve the rural livelihood of peasant farmers is by more social participation. Indeed, this is the hub of the rural problem.

What is meant here by rural livelihood is a composite of conditions – social, economic, political and administrative, and qualitative as well as quantitative. A policy seeking by means of co-operatives or other channels to improve the livelihood of the people in rural areas should not, for instance, be confined, say to agricultural innovation alone. Land reforms which reallocate ownership or reduce rents but which have no other effects, for example, on health or education, do not amount to integrated rural development planning however imaginatively conceived or implemented they may be in a particular sector. On the contrary, they may even inhibit this as when such reforms are but palliatives or defusing devices which result only in diverting social forces the expression of which *was* promising to have restructuring effects.

To what extent administrative approaches can really be expected to change the livelihood of a majority of people in a rural population will depend in part on the prior position adopted by the analyst or policy maker as regards the two extreme sets of options just described. Integrated or unified rural development planning aims at all round improvements by focussing on key issues with inter-sectoral implications. Administrative methods afford only one of the possible routes to this. Furthermore, if social participation is to mean anything in operational terms, thought must be given to what precisely are the substantive issues that could be involved. It is to this topic that we must turn next including the connected problem of false comparisons in development studies.

Social participation

On the concept of "penetration" or "participation" at least one distinguished Africanist has been known to say that while he doubted that he knew what it really meant, as regards rural development planning, peasants knew "because it was they who got exploited". He meant that often the latter were treated simply as the passive partners in an exploitative relationship in which the distribution of inputs and outputs among the parties concerned was gravely unbalanced. It may not be *rural* livelihood that rural social participation promotes.

The kind of social participation to which reference is made here is that which would continue to be forthcoming even after obligatory membership of a co-operative is no longer enjoined by either a governmental or a popular body. Especially where membership is voluntary in terms of a constitution, but compulsory in actual practice, for one reason or another, it is not the philosophical question of whether co-operatives or similar organizations should or should not be voluntary in principle that is the most important. It will be more revealing to ask whether, if membership is no longer enforced (from above), would it nevertheless continue to exist or not in the medium or short run? Would or would not members take it as being in their best interests to keep the organization in existence if in a changed or modified form?

If the answer to this question should be in the negative, there is reason to entertain grave doubts about the wisdom of having that organization at all in the first place. Of course, like other important questions, this one too is rather difficult to answer in many circumstances where the costs and benefits of an organization do not really pertain very closely to its stated aims despite policy pronouncements to the contrary. But this should be no excuse for less-than-relevant inquiries.

Then there are mental smokescreens. False comparisons abound in development studies as well as problems of value transference with which they are sometimes confused. Co-operatives in Britain, because of the Rochdale experience, are still commonly cited in studies of African Co-operatives – despite a considerable widening of the Universe of models that are involved – as providing some kind of standard of achievement against which the performance of co-operatives elsewhere can be measured. This affirmation must needs be considered here. It is a widespread and erroneous line of thinking to suppose that where co-operatives in third world countries have not done as well as, it is imagined, they have done in Britain, this is due to social and other features that are peculiarly characteristic of lower-income developing countries.

A summary impression of the state of co-operatives in Britain in the 1960's, which is the period of reference of this review, would depict a situation which is very far from an ideal or a standard to be emulated elsewhere. In particular social participation is low, certainly so in comparison with reported levels in Scandinavia. As regards the authority of the manager it is not evident that co-operatives as a class of enterprise have afforded any general exception to the phenomenon of the present century usually called the managerial revolution. Also, for any evaluation of what is usually described in Britain as elsewhere as poor management, it is essential to grasp that the authority of the manager has been given more institutional importance overall in co-operative than in other forms of business organization. It was Ostergaard and Halsey's conclusion that, while no single formula could be found to cover either co-operatives or companies, despite their lay Boards, large co-operatives particularly " . . . may in fact be closer to managerial domination than many capitalist concerns. The divorce between ownership and control in co-operatives may be as great, if not greater, than is the case in either capitalist or state-owned undertakings. In capitalist companies there is the possibility of large-investor control, while in nationalised industries although within the industries the managers are clearly dominant, there is always the control exercised from outside by the Ministers and to a lesser extent by Parliament: in co-operatives there is neither".[2]

They reported co-operative democracy in practice in Britain to be nearer to a co-operative oligarchy on such evidence as the growing influence of employees and officials in the control of the co-operative movement, the high proportion of uncontested elections, and tendencies to lengthen the term of office of board members, to reduce the frequency of business meetings and to restrict their functions to purely trading matters.

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[2] G. N. Ostergaard and A. H. Halsey, *Power in co-operatives*, 1965, p. 199. The main line of argument in the present paragraphs is based on this book.

In 1969 the movement in England was considered to be in need of major reorganization. Among proposals put forward were:

a. the amalgamation of a number of retail societies (several uneconomic branches continue, so it is argued, only because of the low wages paid – this since 1957);

b. the trading and social objectives to be set out more clearly (the example of the Rochdale pioneers has not been emulated . . . "we are traders but we are also social reformers");

c. a more efficient performance by management to be sought ("gone are the days consumers will support the movement because co-operation is a worthwhile thing; member and public goodwill will only be maintained if our service and performance are not only equal to, but better than, the average retail business");

d. the active promotion of regional societies (with "market research and forecasting");

e. the establishment of a more effective democratic structure.[3]

All this reads exactly like a critical study on Africa rather than on Europe.

The classical theory of democracy that prevails in co-operative thought everywhere turns on an idea of a "general will" holding that, where there is apathy, low social participation, this general will is not expressed within the society and therefore cannot be interpreted. The extent to which low social participation *is* both the expression "of the malaise as well as the cause of the societies" problems is, of course, arguable. It is however only the fact of minimal participation to which attention is being drawn here, in the interests of correct comparative perspective. It is urgently needed for social science and planning alike that third world development studies should not be insulated departmentally from similar studies elsewhere.

Administrative recommendations

By way of conclusion, a number of substantive issues will now be taken up and recommendations made thereon which if they can be implemented satisfactorily might go some way to improving matters from the reformist rather than more radical standpoint that is the universe of reference of the present study. The first of these pertains to the subject of *membership regulations*. In the marketing organizations which have been studied, membership is usually on the basis of farm or plot ownership only, so that only those possessing land are members. What is to be identified for review here as regards participation and rural livelihood is the effect of this regulation which in some districts amounts to a limitation of membership to but a minority of the districts' total population, and a relatively small minority at that, composed of the landed class. Two points arise for discussion here.

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[3] The quotations are from *Towards regional co-operatives*, by Lloyd Harrison and John Roper. Fabian Research Series 260, London, 1969.

The first of these is that if, in a rural district, a large proportion of the population falls within the category of hired agricultural labour, would it not be equitable as well as more effective for them as well as for the landed class, to be able to participate in the societies?

The second is the question as to whether for marketing co-operatives membership should, in some circumstances, continue to be on a family basis, that is to say a family represented by only one of its members. It may be recalled that in some consumer co-operatives in Europe membership was originally on a family basis in the name of the (male) head of the family, and later developed on the basis of individual membership with that of women predominating. For Africa this proposal is raised on the basis of studies which have shown how crucially important, in certain cases, can be the work of women. One study of the new marketing co-operative in a rural district where agricultural work was done by the women mostly showed how, after the introduction of the co-operative which was supposed to step up production, output fell rather than rose. Co-operative membership was confined to men, and it was the menfolk to whom payouts by the co-operative were made. Not enough of the cash proceeds went to the womenfolk, so output fell. Here is a case of a co-operatives policy having exactly the opposite effect to that which its planners had intended because it was badly implemented as regards membership regulations which were not appropriate in the local circumstances.

If membership in a development organization does not really represent directly what are the dynamic forces in any particular region then it cannot have more than a superficial effect. On the other hand, of course, if membership is too broadly based it might become unmanageable. The question of efficiency arises in discussing this as any other recommendation. Nonetheless, it is most important at least to identify the problem of membership regulations. It is not enough, either for research into co-operatives or for discussion and dialogue about them, just to ask whether they should be multi-purpose or single-purpose. It must *also* be asked when or whether they should be multi-membership.

To turn to a second topic, *organizational capacity*, studies of production co-operatives especially have shown that there might have been fewer problems if their initial planning had allowed for expansion over time and, with regard to social composition, had allowance been made for instance, for the effects of inheritance and succession in the local communities concerned. Then, again, if the organizational capacity of the co-operatives does not allow sufficiently for upward social mobility on the part of members who seek a career in administration and management, these crucial people who, perhaps, owe their training or part of it to a co-operative education programme, will be forced to look elsewhere for their best prospects. The co-operatives will suffer even if what is a loss to them is a gain in another sector.

In these respects, as in others, the classical disease of co-operatives studies is to generalize too widely. To take precautions against this, it is important to distinguish at least between production and marketing societies. In many cases the dividing line between production co-operatives and state farms is faint, while marketing societies perhaps do, depending often on their relationship with commodity boards, represent at least a potential bargaining power; but even state farm policies have forces of upward social mobility in the local population to contend with and to accommodate constructively. Otherwise the whole scheme will tend to lose viability save where social mobility and self-recruitment are more an expression of the permeability of an oligarchy, than a real force for social change and where changes in leadership may be much less significant in themselves.

Third, as regards *administrative structure*, the current practice in most countries is for co-operative planning to put maximum reliance on administrative inputs "from above". Thus commissioners of co-operatives usually have considerable powers. What is to be considered here, however, would amount virtually to a reversal of this practice. Where it is considered that a shortage of administrative and management skills "above" is the most crucial restraint on performance, the administrative shape of an organization should be such that it depends on this input *least*, not most. Management should not have to carry too large a burden overall. Administrative decentralization might improve the prospects for participation and smaller scale organization as regards individual enterprises might, in turn, mean an improved distribution of the elements of a better rural livelihood. Administrative efficiency, however, can seldom be achieved on administrative grounds alone. Therefore administrative decentralization should be accompanied perhaps by politicized federalization, possibly in a hostile environment. Then there is the issue of monopoly. It surely would be counterproductive where a co-operative was introduced essentially to displace an existing monopoly only for the co-operative to become a monolithic monopoly organization itself.

Fourth, it is necessary to distinguish between the significance of *short-run and long-run effects* of new development organizations at the local level. For a low-income population, if such an organization has any effects at all at the local level, the most significant of these in the short run are likely to be economic. That is to say, if as a result of the introduction of a co-operative local incomes do go up or down, this will be noticed immediately, and responded to accordingly, by a low-income population. The net effects that the central planners, on the other hand, are looking out for, classically in the case of co-operative policy-making, are social rather than economic, such as would be long-run rather than short- or medium-run in any case. Unfortunately the standard – even the defining – principle of the conventional co-operative movement, in one version or another, is that social must precede economic change.

The evaluative studies carried out in rural Africa do not provide any marked support for current or recent policies as implemented in respect of co-operative movements where development priorities have been accorded at the local level to economic rather than social facets. In the short-run it may be only very seldom that the local economic benefits of new large organizations will outweigh the local economic costs. Participation in them will be seen by the local people as a very risky business. Most co-operatives are planned by one social group for the benefit of another social group altogether, e.g.

by central planners for small farmers, or by the comparatively rich for the comparatively poor. Some, such ascertain consumer societies, are set up essentially by the relatively well-off for themselves. Others, where local social values put emphasis on local joint action, have been set up on the whole by the poor for the poor themselves. It is these latter that, in the old jargon of development studies are called "traditional" co-operatives rather than "modern". This appellation, however, misses the main point, which, in the context of the discussion here, relates to the extent to which co-operatives may or may not be characterized by a great social divide. Such a divide can be as between one category of membership and another, or new and as yet unregulated or non-institutional rewards and sanctions as between leaders and ordinary members, small and large scale farmers, old and young, men and women – whichever the facet may be that is most crucial to [3]the performance of the organization.

In speaking here of short- and long-run effects it is to the first kind of co-operatives that reference is intended, namely the kind planned by one social category for the benefit of another. Here the co-operative is often found where the management or the administrator is either late in offering a suitable response to short-term local problems or fails to register one at all. The consequences of this delay or inaction can result in such a measure of local co-operative failure that nothing can be done to put aright short of drastic action which is outside the scope of the present discussion.

In societies where there is less social distance between the planners, managers, or administrators on the one hand, and the ordinary members on the other, a more timely steering of events is possible.

To sum up on this final point, what is under discussion here are two sides to the same question. On one side lies the likelihood that there will be little or no spontaneous local social participation where the short-term effects of a new organization, at local level, are economic rather than social and where the effects are negative or, worse, are economically retrogressive. On the other side the counter-measures which central planners might take to correct this situation, if they acted in time, will not be taken because they will be thinking mainly of long-term social effects and in all likelihood they will overlook the short-term economic effects for the local people until it is too late for action other than the abandonment of the whole policy involved.

Despite sometimes enormous ideological and other efforts to the contrary it continues to be one of the essential social facts of much of rural Africa that, between on the one hand central planners and public administrators and on the other the ordinary farmers, social distance is as great as ever. Illustrative of this is the following situation, reported for one district in Tanzania the country of the Arusha Declaration. The central government staff of the project studied are Swahili-speaking who do not understand the local vernacular. They are salaried, transferred often, have no family in the areas, are relatively well educated, socialize freely with each other, have a distaste for manual work themselves and generally identify with élite status in a number of ways. They are not members of the co-operatives they are recommending for the rural development of the district in which they serve and, while they do proclaim the national importance of manual labour and its virtues as an ethic in and of itself, they do not themselves, with the exception of the senior staff member, participate in collective labour. Indeed, they have their houses repaired by the farmers.

The conclusion one comes to after analysing studies such as these is that development objectives have frequently been misplaced. The more co-operatives policies look towards social development in the long-run as their main aim, and the more they are planned and directed at a distance, the less likely they will be to escape the crises so commonplace in the co-operative sector in Africa as elsewhere.

Municipal Training in India

By ABHIJIT DATTA*

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AT THE instance of the Union Ministry of Defence, training in municipal administration for military cantonment officers began at the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi, as early as 1958. Between 1958 and 1962 three short four-week courses were arranged. They were essentially *ad hoc* in nature and each was attended by some fifteen participants.

In April, 1963, the Government of India (Ministry of Health) appointed a committee on the training of municipal employees with Nur-ud-din Ahmed, the then Mayor of Delhi, as Chairman along with four other members. The committee was required to examine the available facilities for municipal training and to make recommendations as to (a) the structure and duration of training for various categories of municipal officers and (b) the institutional facilities required for this purpose. Meanwhile, the Union Health Ministry sponsored a series of *ad hoc* courses at the IIPA for municipal officers, on the model of the previous courses organized by the Institute for the cantonment officers. Between 1963 and 1965, three such courses were launched, of which the first was of four weeks' and the remaining two of six weeks' duration. Altogether a total of 54 municipal officers attended these courses – only a third of the number for whom provision was originally made.

These *ad hoc* and short-term courses were essentially inductional in nature and were probably more useful to the relatively younger cantonment officers. In retrospect, the course content seems to be rather unrealistic in terms of understanding the actual nature and processes of municipal administration in the country, and the needs of the participants. In the absence of a specialized faculty unit on municipal administration at the IIPA, the dependence on guest lecturers was almost overwhelming. The special problems of fulfilling the needs of in-service training were not appreciated adequately in designing the courses and even the training objectives were not spelt out in precise terms, resulting in a wastage of effort that could have been avoided. Despite all these shortcomings, inevitable in a pioneering venture of this kind, the foundation for such courses was well-laid. Although the latter courses became somewhat diversified, their structure was rooted primarily in the basic design evolved in the early years of municipal training at the IIPA.

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* The opinions expressed in the paper are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the IIPA.

Creation of IIPA's Municipal Centre

The Nur-ud-din report was submitted to Government in August, 1963.[1] The committee recommended the establishment of a Central Training Institute and a number of State Training Institutes for the municipal officers. For various reasons, of which the need for economy was perhaps decisive, the Union Government came round to the view that creating a few training centres as separate wings of the existing institutes would serve the purpose equally well. Accordingly, in December, 1966, the national Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration was established as a wing of the IIPA. Later, in January, 1968, three regional centres were set up at Bombay, in the All India Institute of Local Self-Government, at Calcutta in the Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management, and at Lucknow within the Department of Public Administration, Lucknow University. Two years later, in January, 1970, another regional centre was established at Hyderabad within the Department of Public Administration, Osmania University. The centres are governed by the existing rules, working conditions and staffing patterns prevailing in these various institutions and their activities are guided by special advisory committees consisting of representatives from the Union Ministry and other interests. The Director of the IIPA's Municipal Centre is also on the advisory committees of the regional centres.

There is, however, a certain amount of overlapping in the training functions of these centres, which might have some advantages during the initial period of their existence. But, in course of time, the exact role of the national centre at the IIPA will have to be more precisely defined so as to distinguish it from its regional counterparts. If the regional centres are successful in meeting the training requirements of municipal officers in their respective regions, the national centre's training functions in years to come would be limited to experimental courses, to the training of special groups of municipal officers not adequately served by the regional centres, and would provide facilities for officers from the State departments and field organizations connected with municipal government, cantonment officers, township administrators of the various public sector undertakings, and foreign participants. Catering to the needs of these special groups would necessarily entail modification of the existing course patterns followed in IIPA's municipal centre. If these special groups do not present themselves in sufficient numbers, in a regular flow, then their training needs can be served by bringing them within the fold of the IIPA's broader training programme for executive development of Central and State civil servants.

There are, of course, two other possibilities. With all the expertise, facilities and experience of the IIPA in management training, its municipal centre could concentrate on top level management personnel in municipal government – the commissioners and the departmental heads of municipal corporations – by devising suitable management courses in which reliance would be placed mainly on case methods, simulation, and other techniques, rather than, as at present, on lecture-discussions. This would mean the regional centres concentrating mainly on training the various functional categories and supervisory personnel from municipalities, other than corporations. In operational terms, this entails recruitment of more highly specialized and technical staff for these centres and undertaking a massive programme of research and consultancy work in the municipal field, which may not be immediately practicable.

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[1] *Report of the Committee on the Training of Municipal Employees*, Government of India (Ministry of Health), Faridabad, 1965.

The other possibility would be for the IIPA's municipal centre to act as a regional as well as a national centre. This might seem attractive from the point of view of economy, but such a dual arrangement could only be at the cost of the national centre. By its very nature, IIPA is a national institution, and utilization of its resources for legitimate national purposes would ensure its non-competitive role *vis-à-vis* the established regional centres.

Training at the IIPA's Municipal Centre

The first training course organized by the IIPA's municipal centre was for four weeks, for municipal technical officers. The group consisted of engineers and education officers. The idea of a separate rounded course for all categories of technical officers was abandoned, since it was felt that they could equally well attend the centre's six weeks' general course. These general courses followed the pattern evolved earlier in the IIPA, although, as time went on, the course content became more fully adequate and members of the faculty more at their ease and more confident in putting over their ideas to professional and practising officers. Ten general courses were run in the period 1967–71. In 1970 the municipal centre started experimenting with shorter specialized courses for municipal officers and, so far, two such courses have been run. The purpose of these courses following the initial induction is to make training more skill-oriented. They were primarily conceived as refresher courses for those who had already attended a general course. But, as it turned out, the course on budgeting attracted a group of senior corporation accountants who had not taken the general course which might not have attracted them anyway. A further two-weeks' specialized course on personnel administration has been planned.

With the launching of the specialized courses, the importance of the general course has been diminished and the total number of such courses has been reduced from three to two per year. It is expected that ultimately there may be one general course and several specialized courses each year. The 1971/72 programme is for two general courses and three specialized courses to be held.

The specialized courses have revealed certain weaknesses in staffing. These courses tend to revolve round a single faculty member, while the services of his colleagues remain very little used. Within the IIPA there are a number of specialized faculty units, and if a specialized course falls within the competence of any of these units, the internal faculty participation is greater. Otherwise there is too much reliance on visiting lecturers from outside. Efforts are made to match these conflicting considerations of utilization of staff and availability of expertise within the IIPA. Roughly speaking, a target of at least 50 per cent internal lectures is aimed at.

Course particulars: The training courses offered at the IIPA's municipal centre are primarily lecture-oriented. The lecture method is likely to dominate the course structure as long as the courses are of fairly long duration. The absence of a body of case studies covering decision-making problems and those of administrative and other processes also makes it difficult to resort to other training techniques. The faculty is encouraged to undertake research and consultancy in municipal subjects in order that the experience gained thereby can be percolated into training. This is, however, a long drawn-out process. A quicker way to make training more realistic is perhaps to promote exchange of faculty and municipal personnel, but so far it has not been found practicable.

The general course consists of lecture-discussions, group syndicates, individual book review exercises, visits to selected establishments, and group attachments for one week at a time to selected outside municipalities/corporations. The subjects covered in the tenth general course, by way of lectures, are indicated in the following table:

TABLE I

Lecture-Discussions in the 10th Course in Municipal Administration

Topics	*Number of Lectures*
General Lectures	4
Municipal Structure – Comparative	6
Fiscal Administration	4
Financial Administration	4
Personnel Administration	5
Municipal Laws	5
Management Process and Techniques	6
Development Administration	6
Functional Administration	5
Total	45

In the specialized courses, apart from lecture-discussions, there are either workshops or projects – equivalent to the syndicates in the general course, but with the difference that these involve field study.

Before each course starts, the entire faculty meets to discuss any changes needed in the programme, in the light of experience and the suggestions offered by the trainees themselves. The faculty members, in addition to delivering lectures, are required to guide a group of trainees during their syndicate sessions and to take them to their places of attachment. The attachment period in the general course falls during the penultimate week, so that the last week is devoted to finalization of the various reports assigned to participants, and discussions thereon.

Details of the Participants: The number of participants attending the various courses in the IIPA's municipal centre between 1967 and 1971 is tabulated in Table II.

TABLE II

Various Municipal Courses and the Number of Participants

Year	*Number of Courses*	*Total Weeks*	*Number of Participants*
1967–68	2	10	31
1968–69	3	18	88
1969–70	3	18	73
1970–71	4	18	64
		Total ...	256

Numbers attending the general courses averaged 22.7 and for the specialized courses 14.5. This may be compared with the target which had been set - thirty for each general and fifteen for each specialized course. For the general courses, there seems to be a case for reducing the maximum number of places, perhaps to 25. This is desirable also from the point of view of effective guidance by the faculty and ensuring a manageable number in the lecture room.

It was found that seven participants attended the specialized courses after taking the general course. Conversely, one member attended the general course after completing his specialized course.

We now turn to an analysis of the various authorities represented and the types of officers attending the courses.

TABLE III

Authorities represented, Types of Officers and the Number of Participants

Authorities	*Types of Officers*				*Total*	
	Administrative		*Technical*			
	No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
Municipal	151	77	44	75	195	76
State/Union Territory	8	4	1	2	9	3
Public Undertakings ...	1	0	3	5	4	2
Cantonments	17	9	1	1	18	7
Foreign	20	10	10	17	30	12
Total ...	197	100	59	100	256	100
	(77%)		(23%)		(100%)	

N.B.—Percentages are approximations

As the foregoing table clearly shows, the trainees have, as one would expect, come principally from municipalities. Among the foreign participants, only two belonged to central/provincial administrations, although closely connected with municipal administration. Also one foreign participant was an elected chairman of a township – the only elected member to attend these courses. The rest of the foreign participants were all directly involved in local government work in their countries. The various countries represented in these courses are given in Table IV.

TABLE IV

Various Countries represented by Foreign Participants

Country	*Administrative*	*Technical*	*Total*
Afghanistan ...	—	2	2
Ceylon	1	2	3
Fiji	1	—	1
Indonesia	2	—	2
Kenya	1	—	1
Malaysia	1	2	3
Mauritius	2	—	2
Philippines ...	1	1	2
Sierra Leone ...	1	1	2
South Yemen ...	1	—	1
South Vietnam ...	1	—	1
Tanzania	1	—	1
Thailand	7	1	8
Zambia	—	1	1
Total ...	20	10	30

In order to cater for the needs of foreign participants, and also to widen the mental horizon of their Indian counterparts, comparative local government is included as one of the subjects studied on the general course. So far only one foreign participant has attended the specialized course on work study.

Officers from the cantonments attend these courses after a year's "foundational" course at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie. Afterwards, they are posted in the field, study on the job and take departmental examinations on various aspects of cantonment administration. Their intellectual calibre is often somewhat higher than that of the average municipal officer. A longer course in municipal administration of a basic nature appears justified for them. A similar need seems desirable for the young municipal officers in those States where the municipal service is organized on a State-wide basis and a substantial number of new recruits are regularly added to the cadre. This will have to be supplemented by a well thought-out programme of departmental examinations, as in the case of cantonment service.

If the participants for the general courses coming from the State departments and the public undertakings should show a marked increase, then when this occurs it would be better to design special short-term courses to suit their requirements. This stage has yet to be reached.

Fourteen States and four Union Territories have sent personnel to IIPA. The great majority of trainees have come from five States – Uttar Pradesh (most of all), Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mysore and Punjab. This is in spite of the fact that except for Punjab and Mysore, all the other States had been covered by regional centres since 1968, and Mysore as well since 1970. This confirms the earlier observation regarding the overlapping of functions between the national and the regional centres for municipal training. Municipal Corporations, the larger and medium-sized municipalities, each sent some 30/40 trainees, while the smaller municipalities sent twice as many.

Trainees showed a preponderance of administrators over technical officers in a ratio of 77 : 23 though the gap was closed for the specialized courses alone which a dozen from each category attended. Judging from the nature of these courses, one would expect this trend to continue. To what extent similar specialized courses would attract participants who would not be drawn to the general course, would depend primarily on the attractiveness of future courses to administrative and technical officers from Corporations and the bigger municipalities. Perhaps this anticipates the launching of a purely management course for municipal officers conducted through modern training techniques.

Conclusion

The lines on which IIPA's municipal training has developed over the years have now been shown. It is safe to conclude that when the regional training centres grow to maturity, IIPA's municipal centre will still have a great deal of training functions to perform. In a relative sense, the importance of training at the national centre may well diminish as compared with the centre's other activities such as holding seminars, undertaking research projects and providing consultancy services, publishing its journal *NAGARLOK*, and so on. For all these functions, it is essential to operate at a distance from the direct influence of the upper-level governments – the States as well as the centre – so as to ensure that degree of autonomy that academic freedom requires. At the same time, without the active support and confidence of the state and central governments, the effectiveness of IIPA's municipal centre would be greatly reduced. The logical step, in institutional terms, would be to stabilize the co-operative arrangements already existing between the central government and the IIPA, to the common advantage of both.

Prelude to Arusha:
A Study of Productivity Problems on a Rural Development Scheme in Tanzania

By J. R. NELLIS

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"FARMERS, when they are small and numerous, can, if they choose, defeat any system that is available for their control. The employees of a factory, like the men of an army, are subject to external discipline. Failure in performance can be detected, judged and penalized. The same rule holds for certain types of plantation agriculture. A scattered peasantry, carrying on the diverse tasks of crop husbandry, cannot be so controlled and managed."[1]

Introduction

Since the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration, in February of 1967, the Tanzanian administration has moved away from its previous position of generally emphasizing strong central government planning, finance and control, and towards a policy which relies more on local – or low level – initiative and responsibility for development projects. With specific regard to implementing this policy in the field of rural development, the government of Dr. Nyerere has placed strong emphasis on the creation of large numbers of *Vijiji Vya Ujamaa*, or "Socialist Villages."* This programme was broadly conceived by President Nyerere in his September, 1967, pamphlet, *Socialism and Rural Development*,[2] and carried into a detailed planning stage in the second Five-Year Plan, published in mid-1969.[3]

The basic notion underlying the *Ujamaa* villages programme is that socio-economic change of an enduring, meaningful nature can only be brought about on the Tanganyika mainland of Tanzania through the active participation and enthusiastic hard work of rural dwellers, their enterprise to be aided by small but nonetheless critical injections of government expertise and capital, given at crucial moments of need.

This attempt to shift to a reliance on local initiative in the rural areas (and to some extent the entire range of policy changes in the Arusha Declaration summarized under the twin headings of *Ujamaa na Kujitegemea* or "Socialism and Self-Reliance") was not simply the result, as some have argued, of a change in personal ideology on the part of the President. Far more important was the realization, very apparent by the end of 1966, that previous policies aimed at developing the rural areas, and the administrative arrangements used by the government to direct rural behaviour, change and development efforts, were sadly insufficient, inadequate, and sometimes counter-productive.

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[1] J. K. Galbraith, *Economic Development* (Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1964), p. 31.

* *More literally Ujamaa can be translated as "brotherly" in the sense of co-operative and communal.*–Ed.

[2] J. K. Nyerere, *Socialism and Rural Development* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967).

[3] United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July,* 1969 – *30th June,* 1974 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), See Volume 1, Chapter III.

This paper offers some detailed evidence from the experience of one pre-Arusha Tanzanian rural development project to support this contention. The material to be considered is that derived from the operation of the Rwamkoma Village Settlement Scheme, a government controlled cotton farm, located some thirty-five miles south of the town of Musoma, in the Mara Region of north-western Tanzania. The intention in this paper is to demonstrate that in a fairly typical rural development operation the pre-Arusha policies of heavy capitalization and development under centralized control were failures primarily due to the critical lack of a clear understanding by the settlers concerned as to the purpose of the scheme and their lack of commitment to it. These failures led to serious productivity problems on the scheme – problems which need to be understood if one is to gain full appreciation of the whys and wherefores leading to the policy shift in 1967 and the nature of the Tanzanian government's new approach to rural development specifically, and overall development in general.

The Setting

The Rwamkoma scheme was one of the first attempts made to implement the notion of "transformational" agricultural development in independent Tanganyika (as it was then named). This had resulted from the report of the World Bank Mission, "*The Economic Development of Tanganyika*"[4] which was presented on the eve of Independence and which recommended that two methods of agricultural development be attempted: the "improvement" and "transformation" approaches. The improvement method was to be a continuation of the agricultural extension and community development programmes of the colonial régime. These were regarded as long-term, slow, low-capital approaches to rural development, with increases in husbandry and productivity accumulating incrementally over a lengthy, but unspecified period of time.

Realizing that such a low-key approach could not constitute the whole of an enthusiastic newly independent government's plans for the majority of its citizens, and considering the economic potential of bolder, more heavily capitalized ventures, the report also recommended that attention be paid to some few programmes of greater breadth and cost. This was the "transformation" approach, aimed at creating – swiftly and totally – completely altered rural socio-economic situations in the hope that commercially successful programmes could be set up and that the information gathered in such operations would stimulate other similar development schemes under central direction. The independent Tanganyika government accepted the World Bank recommendations, and came to look upon the construction of heavily capitalized settlement schemes as the proper mode of implementing the transformation idea.

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[4] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).

Rwamkoma, one of the very first transformation schemes to move past the planning stage and into the realm of physical reality, was opened in late 1963. Established on virgin land and scheduled for an eventual capacity of 250 settler families, the scheme (it was thought) would ultimately cost £150,000 and was designed to raise the income of the settlers from an estimated average of £25 per annum to an average of £150.[5] With these figures in mind, the Village Settlement Agency (VSA) – the government agency responsible for implementing the scheme, set about recruiting people from the surrounding areas, and got under way the building of a dam, the installation of a piped water supply with frequent and conveniently placed public stand-pipes, and the construction of metal-framed, permanently roofed housing for the settlers. Further, a British expatriate scheme Manager with considerable cotton-growing experience was taken on. Since few policy guidelines existed, and since the VSA headquarters proved slow to provide answers to the numerous questions that arose in the early days of the new operation,[6] the Manager had to assume wide responsibility for the social as well as the economic aspects of the venture. Eventually, a first cotton crop was planted.

The first year of operation, 1964, enjoyed mixed fortunes. The scheme had difficulty recruiting a full complement of settlers, as residents in the neighbourhood began to see how hard was the Rwamkoma work load, irrespective of its attractive water supply and expensive-style housing. The settlers on site, for their part, were finding it difficult to maintain the cotton-picking schedule. Part of the problem stemmed from questionable planning. One local officer interviewed alleged that the scheme had been planned on the assumption that each settler family would provide the equivalent of three or more adult labourers. In reality, this figure was never reached and the scheme was thus in difficulty from the outset. A second part of the problem was the way in which production was organized. In these pre-Arusha Declaration days, there were no firm government policies regarding communal versus nuclear family production methods. Though it was vaguely recognized that the emerging Tanzanian ideology favoured communal or co-operative efforts over individual or family methods, there had been no absolute ruling by government on the matter. Thus, the Managers of the various settlement schemes, Rwamkoma among them, were left to decide for themselves as to which method was suitable for their schemes.[7] It should be noted, however, that the bias of VSA officers (expatriate, in the main) was clearly in favour of plots being assigned to nuclear families. They justified their attitude on the grounds, *inter alia*, that the assignment of specific plots to specific people allowed management to know which farmers were working hard and which were not. And on schemes where work was organized in a communal manner Managers frequently did have difficulty distinguishing hard workers from slackers. As will be seen, this proved to be a serious problem at Rwamkoma, where a communal approach was tried.

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[5] United Republic of Tanzania, *Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development, 1st July, 1964 – 30th June, 1969* (Dar es Salaam: 2 Volumes; Government Printer, 1964), Vol. I, p. 33.

[6] See the doctoral dissertation of Anthony H. Rweyemamu, *Nation-Building and the Planning Process in Tanzania* (about to be published by the Syracuse University Press, N.Y. when this article was being prepared) for information on the difficulties involved in obtaining rapid policy decisions on settlement matters during this time period.

[7] Once chosen, the method of production could not be altered without VSA approval.

Still, it was thought that these were teething troubles and that once the scheme was more solidly established the productivity schedules set down by the Manager would be fulfilled. 1965, it was anticipated, would be a better year. But this was not to be. By the latter months of the year serious productivity-related faults in the entire operation started to come to light. These events of 1965 and early 1966 will now be examined in some detail.

The Problems of Rwamkoma

On 5th November, 1965, the Mara Regional Commissioner arrived unexpected and unannounced at Rwamkoma. The purpose of his visit to the scheme was simply to ensure that the 150 settlers and their families there would be ready to welcome President Nyerere who was scheduled to drive past Rwamkoma the next day. However, once on the scheme, the Regional Commissioner saw that a large amount of cotton was still standing unharvested in the fields. He also noted that very few settlers were out at work on this important task. (In order to prevent crop disease and facilitate the next season's cultivation, all the cotton should have been harvested by early October. By government regulation the residue and any cotton left unharvested should have been burnt off by the beginning of November.)

The Regional Commissioner became visibly upset at what he saw and at the lack of activity in the fields. Although he was generally regarded by knowledgeable observers as a man possessing a phlegmatic character, he began to complain vehemently about the laziness and ingratitude of the Rwamkoma settlers, for whom the Tanzanian government had done much, and yet who appeared to be unwilling to work hard in return.

On this chance visit the Regional Commissioner happened to be accompanied by three armed policemen. This was by no means a common bodyguard in Tanzania at that time, and their unusual presence may have had something to do with security for the approaching Presidential visit. In the event, as the Regional Commissioner's castigation of the settlers gained momentum, he warned the small group of awed settlers present that if they did not begin immediately to work much harder he would personally see to it that strong action was taken to force them to do so and to ensure that they completed harvesting, sorting and grading the cotton crop. The Commissioner then informed the settlers and the small group of expatriate staff and advisers present, that he would return the next day to hold a public meeting which all must attend and at which the whole question of the settlers' work would be discussed.

There undoubtedly existed considerable justification for the Regional Commissioner's anger. The author had visited Rwamkoma a few weeks earlier. Though impressive in terms of physical facilities, the scheme was obviously in a difficult economic position. The cotton crop should have been completely harvested, graded, and sold at the ginnery. Furthermore, the old cotton plants should have been uprooted and burned, and preparations should have been under way for the coming season. But bad luck – in the form of unseasonable rainfall – and low productivity from the settlers had resulted in work falling far behind schedule. The bulk of the cotton had been harvested, but fear of extensive rain damage led the Manager to conclude that the wisest move was to get the cotton – ungraded – into storage shelters. Normally, cotton is graded as it is picked and the task of grading the cotton after it was dumped and mixed up in barns was indeed monumental. A large group of settlers were occupying themselves with this task. However, much cotton remained in the fields that should have been uprooted and burned; the grading work was nowhere near complete, and it was only after lengthy negotiation that the Manager had extracted a promise from the ginnery to remain open until Rwamkoma cotton had been processed.

It was the Manager's stated belief that the problems of the scheme resulted mainly from the settlers' idleness, but he was quick to point out that they were not lazy in comparison with their neighbours outside the scheme. Indeed, if anything, they were more industrious. However, the radical alteration of their work and productivity patterns necessary to make the scheme economically viable had not been achieved.

The Manager was, by all accounts, technically fully competent, spoke excellent Swahili, and he possessed a basic empathy for the local culture and the settlers' social and economic plight. Yet this qualified and experienced man was unable to elicit major change in work habits from the settlers, though he had tried a number of approaches, ranging from oral persuasion, to devolving some responsibility for scheme direction on to an elected settlers' committee, to threats of monetary fines. Finally, during the 1965 harvest, he had been forced to call in TANU Youth League members and convict labour from the local prison in order to get much of the crop harvested. By October, he was quite pessimistic about the future of the scheme.

During the previous months the Manager had frequently reported his growing pessimism and his need for increased disciplinary authority, both to the Regional Commissioner's office in Musoma, and to the Settlement Division's headquarters in Dar es Salaam. The Regional office had not answered the Manager's queries, while Settlement HQ had advised him that they were in the process of working out the details of "pre-co-operative" arrangements for all settlement operations whereby elected settlers' committees, under the tutorial leadership of technically competent Managers (who would possess a veto power on agricultural matters), would gradually assume control of the schemes. It was hoped that the arrangement would bring about an increased involvement of settlers in scheme direction, would create a greater sense of commitment to the settlement projects (none of which were doing very well), and ultimately lead to increased work output. The Rwamkoma Manager, realizing that the proposed HQ solution was a long-term prospect, and already having had some rather negative experiences with an elected settlers' committee, remained discouraged at the prospects for the scheme.

The Manager had sought unsuccessfully to obtain the power to fine slack settlers and now as a result of a chance visit by a senior official it appeared that strong measures would be used to effect a needed change in the behaviour of the settlers.

On 6th November, 1965, the promised meeting took place. The Regional Commissioner returned to Rwamkoma, and brought with him a group of the most powerful and influential people in the Region, including the Area Commissioner, the Regional Police Commander, the District TANU Chairman, the Regional Information Officer, two local Members of Parliament, and a member of the National Executive Committee of TANU.[8] A number of policemen accompanied the group, but only two were armed with rifles. It appeared that the Regional Commissioner had resolved on a show of authority as opposed to a show of force; this became more evident as the meeting wore on. All the settlers were present.

The Regional Commissioner opened the meeting by indicating the Regional Police Commander and requiring him to investigate why the work at Rwamkoma was not progressing at a suitably rapid pace. He then proceeded forcefully to list what he believed to be the reasons for the settlers' poor showing. The Commissioner accused the settlers of coming to work late and leaving early; he stated that their excessive drinking of home-brewed beer was detrimental to the progress of the scheme, and he accused the elected officials on the existing Rwamkoma settlers' committee of "irresponsibility," i.e. of not identifying for the Manager the most idle workers. The Commissioner stated that all the settlers took the government's interest for granted and failed to work sufficiently hard. Declaring that *uvivu ni adui la Tanzania*[9] ("laziness is the enemy of Tanzania"), the Commissioner said that work hours must increase, that the settlers should work after church on Sunday, that there must be less drinking and that scheme leaders must accept their responsibility and supervise more closely the labour of their fellow settlers. Most important, he warned that if these things were not done, the government might close the scheme, or select new settlers, or reduce the level of present amenities enjoyed by the scheme members. In his speech, there was no mention of the use of force to compel settlers to work harder.

The Manager then spoke and stated that not all of the settlers were idle, only some. He warned these settlers that they would be reported and dismissed from the scheme. Other speakers at the meeting included the Area Commissioner, the Chairman of the settlers' committee, and the Regional Police Commander, who stated simply that all of the cotton grading had to be completed by the end of the next week. Unlike most public meetings in Tanzania, there were no questions from the audience, and the meeting ended.

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[8] List of participants in the meeting was obtained from a reliable local source.
[9] *Ibid.*

The immediate effects of the meeting were negligible. Sorting and grading of the cotton continued at about the same speed as previously; no follow-up visits were made by any regional or area officials, and in spite of renewed effort on the part of the Manager, the settlers' committee was still most reluctant to identify the idle. In short, the settlers maintained their previously established productivity patterns. The grading was not completed by the end of the following week, work hours did not increase, and neither regional nor area officials responded to a new plea by the Manager asking for effective disciplinary powers. In December the Manager wrote:

> "Up to the present time, the Manager with strong political support has been unable to persuade the farmers to increase their output, either with words of encouragement or with threats of expulsion. The Village Development Committee (settlers' committee) were handed the responsibility and have had even less success. If Rwamkoma was a State Farm, I have little doubt that as a result of increased discipline the project would become a very productive unit on an economic basis".[10]

At headquarters,* the Assistant Commissioner for Village Settlement, then one of the only African Officers in an expatriate-dominated office, was charged with the task of maintaining settler-staff relations. He was, therefore, frequently on safari, explaining the nature of their debt to one group of settlers, exhorting the farmers on a second scheme to increase their output, and attempting to head off an open fight on a third scheme between the settlers and their European expatriate Manager.[11] In a series of extended conversations with the Assistant Commissioner it became quite clear that he was a firm believer in the methods of persuasion and discussion which he had learned from his previous experience as an officer in the Division of Co-operatives. To the Assistant Commissioner, problems of discipline and work productivity were problems of insufficient explanation. At one point, he stated his position simply: "People will work if they understand what it is they are working towards."[12] He repeatedly stated the maxim that people may be led to work but they cannot be made to work. Thus, at the HQ level of the agency responsible for settlement, the official most concerned with disciplinary matters did not believe in either the necessity or the utility of compulsion as a means to increase settler productivity or as a means of effecting basic behavioural change. Even though it was becoming clear that at Rwamkoma the concept of rapid transformational rural development was in considerable difficulty, the central government authorities responsible for productivity matters were not prepared to sanction coercive measures as a means of possible correction.

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[10] The Manager, "Economic Review of Rwamkoma Pilot Village Settlement" (Rwamkoma Settlement Document RKA/1, Musoma, Tanzania, 10th December, 1965), p. 7.

* *The Settlement Division of the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development was a very small one indeed – in April, 1965 numbering six only – two vacant – one African.* (Ed.).

[11] During the period of the author's research the VSA controlled twenty-four schemes. Of these, eight were managed by expatriate Europeans, the remainder by Tanzanian Africans.

[12] Interview notes, Dar es Salaam, 29th November, 1965.

In other interviews it was made apparent that the Assistant Commissioner's distaste for compulsion as a means of directing social change was generally shared by the higher levels of the administration, including the Minister of Lands, Settlement and Water and his Principal Secretary. The Minister himself stated flatly: "Persuasive leadership, in this country, can accomplish the necessary gains without resorting to any physical coercion."[13] (Indeed, all African officials interviewed in the capital agreed with this philosophy and ascribed the Regional Commissioner's original threat of 5th November to a momentary lapse of good and common sense, undoubtedly brought about by impatience, frustration, etc.). When it was suggested to the Minister that perhaps some sterner measures were justified by the importance of the goal of rapid economic development, he did not agree and maintained that it was a matter of leadership. The colonialists, he said frequently, had to use compulsion because they were unaware of some problems, and they had an insufficient understanding of the problems they did recognize. But the members of an independent government understand the people's problems and the leadership given would be followed. The Minister concluded by noting that he spent a week out of every month, visiting the schemes, instilling " . . . the proper attitudes in the people."[14]

Meantime the Assistant Commissioner had visited Rwamkoma, where he had been sent to assess the situation following the Regional Commissioner's meeting. He returned discouraged by what he had found.

> You talk and talk and nobody changes their ways; the Manager continues with his own methods, ignoring or arguing with directives; even if the settlers are frightened by harsh words they return to regular patterns after two, three days. What's the use? My job isn't to run around making speeches that nobody pays any attention to.[15]

The settlers, said the Assistant Commissioner, though at first fearful, had decided that the Regional Commissioner had accused them wrongly. Moreover, they were beginning to believe that the real problem was the Manager who, so they said, had planned the whole affair; the Regional Commissioner rarely visited Rwamkoma so the Manager must have "informed" on the settlers to the Regional Commissioner, and he was thus responsible for the Commissioner's speech and accusations.

However, the issue that most discouraged the Assistant Commissioner during his visit was his impression that the Rwamkoma settlers looked upon themselves as pioneers; as people who had sacrificed their traditions and former homes for the good of the government. Yet they were false pioneers, said the Assistant Commissioner, for the Rwamkoma settlers seemed capable of totally ignoring all that the government had given them. Indeed, they constantly pressed for more.

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[13] Interview notes, Dar es Salaam, 8th December, 1965.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Interview notes, Dar es Salaam, 8th December, 1965.

On 23rd December, 1965 a meeting took place in the Ministry at Dar es Salaam to make the scheduled annual review of progress at Rwamkoma. After a pessimistic appraisal of the scheme's economic situation, the meeting turned to the problem of settler participation and productivity. It was suggested that discipline could be tightened by the introduction of a monetary fine system. The Commissioner for Village Settlement said that he had investigated this possibility and found that the necessary legal powers did not exist and past experience showed that powers of this kind were open to abuse. It was noted[16] in this meeting that the problem seemed to be that present methods of settler disciplinary control were either ineffectual and indirect – for example, a Manager could hire labour to do the work a settler failed to do and then charge the cost of the labour against that particular settler's scheme debt – or total, in the sense that a Manager could expel a settler from a scheme.

The principal conclusion of the meeting was that the task of the VSA and its scheme managers was not simply to find and recruit people who would work hard. Rather the problem involved the far more complex issue of how to induce and convince ordinary rural Tanzanians to change their whole pattern of work habits. It was obvious that the system in use at Rwamkoma was not achieving this purpose. At the meeting the Rwamkoma Manager suggested that the economic goals of the scheme might be scaled down, and the size of the farmers' plots reduced so as to become more manageable. The Manager's statement implied that incremental, small-scale productivity changes could be accomplished if the economic goals of the scheme were reduced accordingly.

This appeared to be a logical suggestion by the man presumably most knowledgeable of affairs at Rwamkoma. However, the Manager's suggestion was rejected. To explain the reason for this a brief digression needs to be made.

During the interview earlier in December, the Minister of Lands, Settlement and Water had told the writer that the goals of the Tanzanian settlement programme were to improve the life of rural Tanzanian peoples, to increase the production of basic, exportable cash crops, and, as an example to the country, to provide a dramatically increased living standard for the people living in settlements. He said that it was government's declared policy to accomplish all these goals through this single programme. This indeed had been the reply to previous VSA requests for the Ministry to lay down priorities and this is why the Manager's proposals were considered unacceptable.

The meeting next discussed the issue of settler productivity; discussion revolved around how the work system might be redesigned to link monetary reward with daily labour and it was resolved that the cotton plots at Rwamkoma would henceforth be individually demarcated so as to make simpler the task of identifying idle workers. It was also agreed that the major need in regard to settler productivity was a better system of inducements; inducements preferably of a material, monetary nature. There was no mention of the events at Rwamkoma of 5th and 6th November, and during the quite lengthy discussion on how to increase settler labour output no consideration was given to the use of coercive methods.

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[16] From Notes taken at the meeting, Dar es Salaam, 23rd December, 1965.

Following the meeting, the Manager returned to Rwamkoma and laid out the cotton fields into individual plots. He also called the settlers together and attempted once more, and again without effect, to persuade them to put more effort into the scheme. In mid-January, 1966, a letter from Rwamkoma, signed by the Secretary of the settlers' committee, arrived at the VSA in Dar es Salaam. The letter said that many members of the scheme were dissatisfied with the state of affairs at Rwamkoma, and stated further that the Manager was the person responsible for all the problems that had arisen. The settlers complained that they had received insufficient money for their 1965 crop,[17] and five specific complaints against the Manager were made.

1. He had told them "anyone at all who wants to go should go";
2. he had told the settlers that all settlement schemes had been closed except for Rwamkoma and Kitete (a wheat-growing scheme in Mbulu District);
3. he said "in front of all the settlers" that he was there on loan from England and he was not the leader of the scheme;
4. he "called us lazy and said we do not want progress on the scheme";
5. "he helped put us under police guard last November and the Area Commissioner (sic) sent policemen having guns."[18]

The Manager promptly countered these complaints in a letter[19] of his own to the Commissioner at VSA headquarters. He pointed out that he had been misinterpreted, that apathy reigned at Rwamkoma, ridiculed the accusation that he was to blame for the work schedule delays and commented that he could scarcely be blamed for idleness among the settlers when he had no disciplinary powers to prevent slack behaviour.

Events at Rwamkoma drifted on through the first eight months of 1966. Finally, in the early fall of 1966, the Manager was given another assignment and an African official was designated to replace him at Rwamkoma. In all this period, there had been no further labour-related visits by the regional or area authorities, and there had been no further threats that coercive measures might be used. One year after the Regional Commissioner's surprise visit, the productivity level at Rwamkoma was virtually unchanged. The only major change on the scheme had been the breakdown in relations between the expatriate Manager and the settlers, culminating in the Manager's removal from Rwamkoma.

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[17] 1965 cotton pay outs to farmers were lower than the 1964 amounts due to the introduction of a 5 per cent "Development Levy" on all cash crops.

[18] Resumé of a letter titled "Problems of Rwamkoma Village" (Dar es Salaam: File No. Rwamkoma open file C-VSV 16/2, No. 167).

[19] This letter appears in the same file as that noted above. *ibid.*

Conclusion

The most important point illustrated by this summary of events at Rwamkoma is that the Tanzania government's original hope of imposing successful development from above on to unprepared, uncommitted and unknowledgeable peasant farmers was quite swiftly demonstrated to be, if not an outright impossibility, then at least a project which would need and take much more time than had originally been anticipated. This lengthened time scale defeated the whole rationale of the transformation approach, for it had been assumed that the high costs of the Village Settlement programme would be justified by a *rapid* return on the investment. The experience of Rwamkoma – and the experiences of most of the other new settlements as well – demonstrated that a simple restructuring of the economic situation did not effect any immediate change in behaviour and productivity patterns.

In other words, the Rwamkoma problems showed that the initial economic timetables of the programme were far too optimistic and that it would take a lengthy educational-indoctrination programme before the new settlers could be expected to meet the productivity schedules necessary for viability. Government saw this, realized that the transformation approach was a failure in cost-benefit terms, and began to search for alternative methods of rural change. Some might draw the conclusion from the Rwamkoma experience that economic and administrative improvements could have been effected by breaking up the farm into nuclear family plots. The decision-makers in the Tanzanian régime, with their differing assumptions on the question of how society should be organized, interpreted Rwamkoma events as but another of the indicators of the poverty of a monetary, "individualistic" approach to rural social change. Thus, the demands, complaints and production difficulties of the Rwamkoma (and other) settlers convinced Tanzanian leaders that new, low-cost methods of rural change had to be devised; methods which would rely as much or more on instilling commitment and enthusiasm in the rural people as on capital inputs. Given the Tanzanian ideology then in the initial stages of articulation, the rational result was the Ujamaa village.

An important question, of course, is why did the Rwamkoma farmers not work harder than they did? The difficulty with this question is that there exist too many plausible partial answers, but not enough hard, comparative data upon which to base an authoritative opinion. For example, it would not be difficult to attribute the low levels of production on Rwamkoma to the poor relationship which existed between the farmers and their expatriate Manager. Some conflict could have been foreseen from the outset, given the structural arrangements of the scheme which tried to balance authority and responsibility between the settlers and management. The division of authority predictably resulted in a division of viewpoints. To attribute the difficulties to the Manager being an expatriate would be quite misleading, for on other settlements with African managers productivity problems similar to those of Rwamkoma arose as settlers repeatedly failed to take on to themselves responsibility for discipline.[20] Settler leaders were very hesitant to report their friends and neighbours to government officials, be these black or white. Thus, it was not surprising that later reports indicated that production did not significantly increase, nor did complaints decrease in number at Rwamkoma after the appointment of an African Manager.

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[20] See J. Nellis, "Administering Social Change: The Problems of Kabuku," in R. Yeager and F. G. Burke (eds.), *Rural Transformation in Tanzania: The Village Settlement Experience*, forthcoming.

From this, one might argue that poor management techniques, rather than poor managers were principally at fault. At Rwamkoma, under communal arrangements the settlers were unwilling and the Manager unable to distinguish "good" from "bad" workers. For the Manager, keeping careful track of more than 150 scattered farmers who were performing varied daily tasks was an enormously difficult and probably physically impossible job. He therefore had to depend on the elected settler leadership group to aid him in providing information on farmers and maintaining the work schedule, and their co-operation was not forthcoming. Had wages been paid, or some sort of quick and substantial economic pay offer been made, such incentives might have succeeded in enlisting committed assistance from the settlers and their leaders. But Rwamkoma did not and could not provide such hard inducements. The settlers saw themselves united in a struggle to obtain from government as many goods and services as possible, at a cost of minimal change of established behaviour patterns. Until the Arusha Declaration government never came to a consistent conclusion on how to handle this problem.

No doubt production at Rwamkoma was also adversely affected by the differing viewpoints of settlers and government as to the benefits being derived from the scheme. The settlers found that they were required to work much longer hours than they did on their traditional homesteads, but that the additional *cash* pay off for this added labour was slight. They therefore protested and failed to keep up production schedules. Officials, on the other hand, pointed out that government had provided a considerable amount of housing, a public water supply, technical advice and expensive agricultural inputs – such as aerial insecticide spraying of the cotton – and that these expenses incurred a substantial debt which had to be recovered. The settlers appeared to feel that it was right for government to provide such services, as they had answered government's call, left their old homes and come to this new scheme. They remained unimpressed with the argument that the physical services at Rwamkoma constituted a pay off which had to be earned by increased productivity. As the Assistant Commissioner of Village Settlement put it, they constantly pressed for more. It was this type of settler attitude which, when combined with the emerging socialist ideology of the day, led the Nyerere régime to scrap the village settlement scheme and seek what it regarded as a more just, sensible and egalitarian method of rural development.

Finally, the Rwamkoma experience illustrates how crucial are communications between central government and local project. It must remain a matter for conjecture whether some of Rwamkoma's difficulties and misunderstandings might have been avoided if VSA headquarters had been able to supply the Manager with clear cut directions and if greater interest in the scheme had been shown at regional level; or, had a greater spirit of co-operation prevailed, would greater settlement commitment have resulted in a higher productivity level? These issues have not been lost on Dr. Nyerere's government; the new approach, as given in the Second Five-Year Plan, reflects the lessons learned.

> The promotion of Ujamaa villages must strike a balance between:
>
> (i) the need for vigorous leadership and official encouragement necessary to ensure that the programme gains impetus and is attempted on a wide scale; and
>
> (ii) the need to avoid the dangers of bureaucratic control, coercion and over-capitalization, which would negate the very principles of self-help and co-operation which the villages are intended to embody.[21]

Such thinking is the heritage of the ill-fated, but educational Tanzanian transformation attempt.

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[21] *Second Five-Year Plan*, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 4. For a more lengthy analysis of the entire Settlement venture which offers further evidence in support of the view that Rwamkoma was not an isolated case, and demonstrates in greater detail how the disappointment of Settlement led to the *ujamaa* approach, see Chapter Six in J. R. Nellis, *A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example* (forthcoming from Oxford University Press).

The Role of the District Officer in Kenya Today

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DURING the period of colonial rule in Kenya, the Provincial Administration was the administrative arm of the Government machinery which had great responsibility for executing government policies and for carrying out various programmes. It remained the principal administrative unit of the government system, under control from the centre, until the independence constitution of 1963 which provided for a more decentralized system of administration within the new Regional Authorities. At this period, the provincial commissioners became chief civil secretaries to the Regional Assemblies, while District Commissioners and district officers became the Regional government agents, and Assistant Regional government agents respectively.

However, when Kenya became a Republic in December, 1964, the Provincial Administration was transferred to the Office of the President.[1] The significance of that change was that, in addition to the traditional duties of this administrative set-up, new ones were added which emphasized the role of that administrative system in the development efforts of the country. This change was to provide provincial commissioners and their officers in the administrative hierarchy with a new broadened outlook in their day-to-day duties in the country, in particular as the field representatives of the President. Thus, "the Provincial Commissioner (and his officers down the line) now operates in an unintegrated system, where besides being directly responsible for maintenance of law and order he is expected to be the overall co-ordinator of development activities."[2]

The Provincial Administration hierarchy in Kenya provides a well laid out administrative system from the provincial commissioner for the province; the district commissioner for the district; the district officer in charge of a division; (the district assistants should be mentioned here – they are executive officers and not administrative officers but, because of the shortage of the latter, they have often taken charge of divisions); chiefs in charge of locations; and at the village level are the sub-chiefs responsible for sublocations. It is through these administrative channels that the central government penetrates the rest of the country and actually makes its impact and presence be felt by the people. At each administrative level there are duties and obligations that the occupant of such an office must attend to, and here our main concern will be with the district officer.

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* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for Development Studies or of the University of Nairobi.

[1] For the development of the Provincial Administration since independence, see Cherry Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya," in the *Journal of Commonwealth Studies, Vol. IV, No.* 3, *November*, 1966.

[2] See Goran Hyden "Basic Civil Service Characteristics" in the *Development Administration*: The Kenya Experience, edited by Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu. Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1970; p. 15.

The title of a district officer does not imply the complexity of the job, nor the many unspecified miscellaneous activities that fall to his charge. The district officer is the government's chief representative in a division and his actions and behaviour toward the public are usually taken by them to indicate what government is all about and how it functions. As such, he represents the authority and the power of the state – indeed the reference point of any activities concerning the attention of the government in the field. He is the government information man on the state of his division, for example, on weather conditions and the state of crops; he is expected to keep a hold on the pulse of his division – to know the people's hopes, fears and wishes and to report accurately as to its general well-being. To be able to administer his division according to the expectations of the government, co-ordination of the technical departments in the division is of great importance, and the district officer is expected therefore to ensure that the work of departments in his division is properly co-ordinated – e.g. the agricultural, veterinary and the community development departments.

The co-ordination of the activities of his specialist colleagues places the district officer in a strong strategic position in the sense that his is the only office that penetrates the functions of each of the technical departments in the division. In most cases the district officer is a generalist administrator and it is as such that he convenes meetings – usually held monthly – of the technical officers in his division, to discuss and to co-ordinate departmental and inter-departmental activities. He is the Chairman who must help his colleagues over their individual problems, resolve their complaints as best he can. His status is that of government chief agent at divisional level. It is usual for the departmental officers to send their monthly reports to him and these form the basis of his own monthly report to his district commissioner.

His office is held responsible for the good and efficient administration of the whole division. One of the disadvantages he faces in such circumstances is that he must rely on the technical personnel for advice on complex matters. In such a context, diplomacy in approaching technical staff members is essential so as to ensure the ready provision of all available information. Difficulty and an unsatisfactory working relationship ensue in situations where the district officer shows arrogance in his attitudes towards departmental personnel. Where the district officers are younger (which is the case in most parts of Kenya) than his colleagues, tensions can rise high. Sometimes, technical officers complain of the status that the district officer enjoys in the division, and look askance at the youth and inexperience of the administrator as compared with their own. Such status conscious attitudes have tended to place a restraint on co-ordination and to enhance conflict within the divisional team.

The role of the district officer in Kenya is not clearly defined and this deficiency has tended to place him in a multi-purpose functional administrative role. Whenever his responsibilities are set down, usually it is in very general terms but his duties and functions in any case have developed on a pragmatic and piecemeal basis over a long period. Indeed this trend even goes back to the days before independence. The lack of a specific handbook of clear administrative guidelines for the district officer has caused difficulty and frustration to the newly recruited young graduate district officers. It is reasonable that some administrative guidance should be provided in terms that are clearly set out.

Despite the foregoing difficulties the office of district officer still enjoys considerable prestige and authority. The traditional status plus the authority commanded by the office still carry weight in many rural areas in Kenya. Exaggerated belief in the possession of rural respect can tempt the district officer into the unwise use of discretionary powers and authority which can lead to accusations of abuse of power. Attention to this danger has often been drawn by government, with the warning that "although they have such power, it could prove dangerous if not properly disciplined."[3]

There is no specific Act of Parliament empowering the district officer to maintain law and order and he has to rely mainly on the Chief's Act, which confers upon Chiefs almost unfettered discretion in this sphere of administration. Under the Act, the Chiefs are empowered to prevent offences, to order any suspected law-breaker to appear before them, to arrest any suspected wrong-doers, to control the brewing of local liquor, to employ any number of people to help him enforce order and to issue orders requiring people to perform certain public functions, especially in the event of an emergency.[4]

The implication of this is that the district officer, to be effective in his area, must work very closely and comparatively with the chiefs who work directly under him. This situation compels him too to use the chiefs office to achieve or accomplish his administrative objectives which require the backing of law. This on the one hand puts the district officer in a vulnerable and a disadvantageous position *vis-à-vis* the chief, although of course the latter is subordinate to him administratively speaking. However, sometimes the district commissioner by-passes the district officer and directs the chief to do something in his location, and the district officer is informed subsequently of what was occurring within his area of administrative jurisdiction. This practice tends not only to weaken the district officer's morale but also tends to create distrust and a poor working relationship within the district which can endanger the formal system of communication.

How does the district officer go about his work? He has a well established channel of communication which has a rather militaristic flavour to it. Below him are the chief and sub-chief. He utilizes this channel to a considerable extent so as to keep the people informed of events and policy decisions affecting their area. He does this by convening a meeting with the chiefs who would later convene a meeting of sub-chiefs in their respective locations and pass the message to them. Alternatively, and possibly if the matter is of great urgency, he may convene a joint meeting of both chiefs and sub-chiefs. Normally, he keeps in touch with the people by passing directives to the chiefs, by writing to them, by sending runners, or by visiting them himself. To a great extent, this depends on the degree of literacy of the chiefs, the nature of the message and his available physical resources. If the chiefs are literate, he may write to them and expect information from them through the same media, but at times he may be in an area where none of the chiefs are literate, in which case he could send his Administrative Police with verbal information. If the message is important, and if time allows, he may visit them – this is usually the case, and especially when he does not want to take the risk of having his message misinterpreted or misunderstood.

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[3] Speech by the Minister in charge of Provincial Administration to Senior Administrative Officers, as reported in *Daily Nation*, 10th May, 1969.

[4] Laws of Kenya, Chapter 128.

More often, the district officer uses the traditional platform of discussion usually known as "baraza". Although the usefulness of this medium has been questioned, it is still the most effective means of reaching the people directly and so avoiding the delay and misconstruction liable to occur through use of his chain of command. A "baraza"* provides the traditional public platform used for discussing issues concerning the community. However, this platform was misused and consequently misunderstood during the colonial administration, because it was used as an occasion when people were to be told what to do and what not to do. Nowadays at "barazas" the district officer explains to the members of the public the Government's plans in various fields of development, and he also tries to weigh the public's reactions to his explanations; these are often made clear during "question time" – a traditional part of most barazas. This style of public communication on such occasions has developed as a healthy administrative technique. "During the colonial days, the people were rarely allowed to air their difficulties. At present, the people are free to speak their minds and tell the Government what they want."[5]

The socio-economic and political environment in an independent Kenya has changed or modified the role of the district officer considerably. The demands that have been brought by this phenomenon have brought new responsibilities and have made his role very much that of an extension agent and planner in the rural areas.

In the countryside many social groups have emerged which undertake various projects in the development effort. For example: women's *mabati* groups, 4-K Clubs, *Nyakinyua* groups and many others to pursue varied goals and objectives. Such groups never existed before, but with *harambee* spirit now prevalent in the country, since independence they have sprung up and help to increase the district officer's work-load. Today many traders apply to him for loans and seek his help over other matters concerning trade, licences, controls, etc. The social environment today presents an opportunity for leadership, responsibility and flexibility on his part. Today, one of the roles expected of the District Officer is that of initiating self-help projects of various kinds, e.g. village water supplies, rural dispensaries, cattle dips and village schools, in co-operation with the people in his area. This role places him in a position of leadership in the community development programmes. He is expected to work together with the local leaders' committees in mobilising the people to contribute their labour and any other necessary services. In such cases he is expected to adopt the attitude of a community leader and an adviser rather than that of a ruler. However, sometimes it becomes extremely difficult for the district officer to reconcile differences which arise among local leaders and to get them to work co-operatively towards agreed community goals.

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* *Throughout East Africa baraza has been theKiswahili word generally used for public meetings and for meeting places – hence, though no longer so in Tanzania, to Courts.* (Ed.).

[5] As a District Officer was reported as having explained to the people while addressing them at a baraza. *Daily Nation*, Saturday, 29th August, 1970.

Sometimes if the district officer convenes a meeting of local leaders they issue him with a directive telling him that they are not prepared to discuss any self-help development in their area *unless* the district officer promises to have one of the chiefs in the division dismissed – a power he does not possess. Such environmental factors can frustrate the work of the district officer, and if he is not considerate and patient he will fail to carry the people and their leaders with him towards the community goals that have been set and his will be a dormant unresponsive division.

The present district officer, unlike his predecessor, is continuously faced with important tasks concerned with the implementation of central government plans at the grass roots level. No matter what the nature or sector of such plans (e.g. agriculture, veterinary, community development, trade) he must be involved and is expected to offer help to the functional departments in their implementation. Where there are no development plans, the district officer is expected to initiate them. This advice was given to newly recruited district officers at the Kenya Institute of Administration by a senior government official, "you will be alone most of the time without someone to help you to make decisions. The progress of the area where you will be posted will depend very much on the advice that you give to your senior officers. You must learn to initiate development programmes, ideas and aspirations of your area".[6]

In an attempt to meet such role expectations, the district officer confronts various obstacles on his way. Like any field administrator in a human society, he must first respond to the beliefs and values of the people in his area which are sometimes very different from his own and for the most part values and beliefs that would be difficult to change at all radically. This happens in many cases in regard to self-help projects. People in one area might feel that they need a number of dispensaries and not schools or vice versa. To convince them of what are really their most urgent needs can prove a very difficult task. In such cases it sometimes becomes a competition between the district officer and such local people involved in making decisions on self-help projects. What happens in these circumstances is that a shrewd district officer deploys a diplomatic approach in bringing the people to realize what is at stake. On the other hand, the brash district officer goes to extremes and imposes his own decision. Such behaviour does not pay, indeed it fosters continuing discord and conflict.

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[6] A talk given by the then Deputy Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, to newly recruited District Officers at the Kenya Institute of Administration on Monday, 27th November, 1967.

In some areas, if the district officer is too ambitious in initiating new projects, difficulties arise because the people and their leaders oppose his ideas which they may regard as radical and incompatible with the sometimes predominantly traditional ethos of their society. His job then becomes complex and calls for a lot of patience. To surmount this kind of obstacle he must be flexible in calculating the rate at which changes in the social beliefs can be achieved and try to cultivate the kind of environment in which he is most likely to succeed in achieving the popular support he needs for his projects.

Prior to independence, people were often suspicious of programmes initiated by district officers and were reluctant to commit themselves thereto. However, today's district officer is in a much better position to get enthusiastic support because, by initiating an acceptable self-help programme in an area, he creates a sense of belonging on the part of the people, something that was never successfully cultivated before. "Self-help projects have thrived better in areas where the district officer is personally involved and gets all the local leaders to be interested."[7] Environmental and traditional constraints that confront the district officer in his work in Kenya today depend by and large on the geographical area to which he is posted. For example, in the most advanced areas in the country, such constraints will be less than in a relatively undeveloped area.

As the government's chief agent, the district officer is responsible for making the presence of central government felt by the people in his division. He must therefore be knowledgeable about his area and the problems existing there. In addition to assuming new roles connected with national development activities, he still performs various traditional field administration duties apart from the co-ordination of the activities of the technical departments. For example, he supervises district prisons which are of a much lower standard in comparison to those run by the Central Government. He is also responsible for the conduct of various officers, for the issue of permits to move grain from one area to another, for settling a miscellany of domestic disputes, for medical relief in times of disaster (e.g. during a famine). He has to attend various auctions and to deal with any natural calamity as may arise (e.g. a flood following exceptional rainfall). During a national census, it is his role to supervise the enumerators. Another role that has become quite entrenched in his office even today is that of collecting Graduated Personal Tax which involves his using Administration Police for the actual collection under his directions. The authoritarian style that was common prior to independence is still present, but today there is more willingness on the part of the people to pay up.

The evolution of many of these duties has tended to make people take it for granted that they are part and parcel of the district officer's role. Such an association with such activities of long-standing has tended to create a well established image of the district officer's work and of his office as the custodian of the *status quo*.

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[7] Experience of a former district officer during the post independence period, reported to the writer.

While the value of an agricultural extension worker's services is now much better appreciated than it used to be, it is still the district officer's role to accompany them and help them to persuade the people to adopt innovative methods of farming. In Kenya today, such campaigns have involved persuading farmers to plant more tea, to plant high yield maize varieties and also on the intensive use of fertilizers and other chemicals essential for crops. One reason for the district officer's presence is that in many parts of the country, farmers regard his office as a source of profitable and beneficial inputs for the farmer. This belief has evolved with the office since, many years before independence, the colonial district officer spent a considerable amount of his time on agricultural matters. The district officer has to take charge and fill any vacuum in the departmental representation in his division; for example, he would function as the divisional sports officer where there was no other suitable office-holder or he would be expected to advise people on co-operative matters if the division lacked a co-operative officer. Thus inescapably he becomes "a jack of all trades."

The diversity of these roles expected of the district officer tends to confuse his administrative work considerably since he cannot devote adequate time to any one activity: also to some extent it depends on the temperament of the individual district officer and the time available to him, what particular facets of his work receive his priority attention. The many roles expected of the district officer often create envious attitudes in the personnel of the technical departments in his division which could "lead to tensions and a breakdown of the team spirit which is widely recognized as essential to successful administration."[8]

The district officer in Kenya is constantly faced with the problem of housing new government officers posted to his division and, whenever a government department is to be established in the area, the responsibility of ensuring that its activities run smoothly devolves upon him. Accordingly, "if any department seeks to sponsor a scheme, his views on the subject are sought and are given due weight, because he is always the central element in its successful implementation."[9]

The district officer being the government's principal officer in his area, is expected to stand host to many VIPs who would visit the division. This role has evolved with the office from colonial times. However, today the demand on the district officer's scarce time in this regard imposes a considerable burden on top of the many development activities that also require his attention. Self-help projects are these days visited by Ministers of Government and senior officials and invariably they are being guided by the district officer and local Members of Parliament. On such occasions VIPs usually address the local residents at the projects sites. During such times, there is a tendency for local MPs to complain if the district officer is invited to address the people before they are called upon. The implication here is that the question of leadership in such areas is still subtle and relatively undefined. The district officer is not regarded as the leader of the people in such areas as was the case in the past. He is regarded by local MPs as just a civil servant, and therefore his past leadership role is now in the hands of the politicians.

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[8] Brian C. Smith, Field Administration, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York: Humanities Press, 1967; p. 117.

[9] See Haridwar Rai, "Helping the District Officer in India," in the *Journal of Administration Overseas, Vol. VIII; No. 1, January,* 1969.

Unlike his predecessors the present-day district officer serves a politically sovereign state. He is the official intermediary between the people and the government, whereas the role of the politician (at MP level) is to represent people in his constituency in the National Parliament. The emergence of this new role relationship is a phenomenon that has undermined the past district officer's political leadership and influence in his administrative area. Once he played the role of a ruler and leader and that of an agent for articulating the needs and feelings of the people. However, today he cannot claim any more than a politician to be the sole spokesman of the people.

As a public officer in an independent State, he is expected to concentrate on his executive and administrative duties and regard politics as the prerogative of the local and national politicians. This role differentiation in some cases has been well-nigh untenable. In part this is because members of the public often still regard the district officer as the recipient of political grievances since he still occupies a powerful and authoritative official position, notwithstanding the role of his local MP. It was this incongruity that led Dr. Nyerere, as Chief Minister (Tanganyika) in 1960, to say that: "The proper person to face political attack is the politician . . . The elected member is the proper recipient of local grumbles; and the sooner we can get away from the old habit by which every sort of grievance is laid at the district commissioner's door, the better."[10]

In Kenya a measure of conflict has continued between politicians and field administration officers. It has been discussed on many occasions and around 1965, the President of Kenya referred to the subject in no uncertain terms. He differentiated the role of the politician as that of an "instrument through which the people make their voices heard in the legislative body of the country."[11] He emphasized that an elected MP should take that responsibility accordingly and that he also had "a right to know what was happening in his constituency." However, such an MP should not use that position "of influence to bully civil servants into deviating from national programmes. Civil servants are responsible to their Ministers and cannot accept instructions from other politicians."[12]

On the role of the administrator H.E. The President said that his role was that of the professional. "He is employed by the Government to get things done. There are not many of us, I hope, who would presume to tell a doctor how and where to operate on a sick person. We should apply the same restraint in our dealing with other professionals . . . and District Commissioners are as much professional as are doctors and engineers."[13]

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[10] A circular letter published in *Journal of African Administration*, 1961, p. 108.

[11] Speech by the President of Kenya at K.I.A., 15th December, 1965, *Kenya News Agency Handout* No. 768.

[12] *Ibid.*

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the district officer today plays a political role, but it would not be correct to deny that situations can arise where the administrator becomes involved in political issues. This can occur in various forms. Three instances can be given here. Firstly, the duty to maintain law and order is clearly placed on the district officer. This implies the maintenance of political stability. The district officer can find himself as peace-maker between disputing political factions. Secondly, when political tension is rife the district officer must advise his district commissioner whether or not to issue a permit for a political meeting to be held. His impartiality can be questioned and some MPs have advocated that the police and not the provincial administrator should decide on whether to allow political meetings. Thirdly, the district officer's supervisory functions in respect of local government lead him on occasions into the political sphere. He is an automatic member of the Area Council in his division and he sits on some of the more important committees, such as the finance committee. Here he can exert a lot of influence in supervising the decision-making process indirectly. Though he might not appear to be active on the floor of the Council, he can indicate his support for a particular group which favours the Council action which he believes is right. By using such a technique, he becomes a part of the power structure within the Council. In situations of this kind, taking sides becomes inevitable.

The district officer can be required by his district commissioner to act as the chairman of the Divisional Land Control Board. This board is usually composed of progressive farmers, traders, teachers from various communities in the division and the chief of the location. The purpose of the board is to consider all land transactions, since in Kenya, according to law, no land transaction is valid unless it has been approved by a Land Board. The primary consideration of the board when deciding whether to approve land transactions should be likely effect on the economic development of the land concerned or on the maintenance or improvement of standards of good husbandry.[14] According to the Ministry of Lands and Settlements, land boards should not worry unduly about the immediate social effects of a transaction but should accord major importance to the economic implications.

However, this is not followed in practice even if the district officer as the chairman tries to insist on the proper policy being followed. The main reason for this failure is because the majority of the members already know the people selling or purchasing such land and they consider this personal knowledge sufficient evidence and do not worry about the economic considerations as set out by the ministry. Board members seem to worry about "so-and-so" obtaining a piece of land because of the social significance attached to land ownership and so it becomes extremely difficult to refuse consent to such transactions on economic grounds. This is just another example of environmental constraints on the district officer's work which have evolved within the present social and economic situation in Kenya.

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Land Control Act, Section 9 (1)(a).

The district officer has a relatively free hand in running his division and the more successfully he is able to make it tick and show local progress and prosperity, the greater the autonomy and freedom he gets from the district commissioner. Administratively speaking, he is the manager of the entire division and interference from the district commissioner is minimal, save in matters of major importance or of special urgency which require his guidance or advice. Some district commissioners encourage their district officers to be as self-reliant as possible in making decisions in their areas. The district commissioner cannot visit the district officer's area without prior notice of his intention to do so. This in fact implies a degree of functional autonomy from the district commissioner.

This functional autonomy needs to be encouraged but the district officer is still often left in a very weak position, particularly the newly recruited officers who are first sent to the field to learn through trial and error. This is because no induction training is systematically provided for such officers initially and in the case of graduates usually not until after the completion of two years of service. Inexperience inevitably inhibits the exercise of that functional autonomy which is rightly considered desirable.

Finally, the work of the district officer is of great interest and is most challenging; but he is faced by many environmental socio-economic and political problems which have been discussed here. Those environmental problems should always be considered as important variables upon which depend whether the district officer will be able to play his expected role. His position in the Kenya field administration is a difficult one and indeed reflects many of the problems confronting development administration today.

Review Article

TWO BLADES OF GRASS – RURAL CO-OPERATIVES IN AGRICULTURAL MODERNISATION, edited by PETER WORSLEY; *Manchester University Press*, 1971; bibliography and index; X plus 370 pp; £4.80.

Agricultural Co-operatives – Tradition and Modernization

In the last two years two books on Co-operatives of major significance have been published, one (reviewed here) from a Seminar at the University of Sussex, the other,[1] dealing with East Africa, from a Seminar at the University of Uppsala. Together they constitute a radical critique both of the sociology of Co-operatives and of many facets of their practical working. The Uppsala seminar concentrated mainly – not exclusively – on the traditional claims of the Co-operative Movement to foster participation, democratic control, economic advantage to small farmers, socialism and the defeat of capitalist middlemen, convenience to Government, an egalitarian society, and continuity with indigenous tradition. By closer examination of the actual performance of East African Co-operatives and of their social and political results, considerable doubt was cast on the general validity of these claims, mainly by analysis of the Co-operative leadership, by scrutiny of the actual process of administration and management, and by comparison between socialist and egalitarian ideals and actual achievement.

The Sussex seminar, at a rather more theoretical level, was concerned mainly with the relationships between Co-operatives and forms of traditional co-operation (overlapping here with Uppsala) and with more general analysis of the social situations which might be said to foreshadow probable failure or probable success – and much depends upon how "success" is defined. It is certainly possible to find commercially successful Co-operatives which are not socialist, egalitarian, democratic or participatory in any strong sense.

Perhaps the most exciting parts of this book are those which analyse the relationship between traditional society and the ways in which the same society would have to work if it is to accept "modernization"; including changes in techniques in production, in marketing, in attitudes to security and risk, in attitudes to "strangers", in ways of social organization and regulation, in values and definitions of socially acceptable behaviour.

The first Paper, by R. P. Dore, brilliantly sets the scene for this examination. He points out that the "solidarity" of traditional rural communities – their allegedly each-for-all character – is not in fact monolithic. Co-operative action (for building a house, weeding, pathclearing, etc.) normally includes only part of a community – a lineage, age-set, or other sectional groups, although there may be special functions where the whole community is involved. To put this in other words, the community, through its *whole* system of rules of behaviour, achieves a fairly stable balance between a number of separate and continuing sets of loyalties and obligations within families, lineages, castes, age sets, etc. This point is further and sharply emphasized by Dov Weintranb in a later Paper on "Village Organization in Israel," in describing case histories of *moshavim* in which several lineage groups (*hamoula*) are expected to combine in a single, self-governing co-operative community. Over a considerable field of action, family or lineage loyalty is not swallowed up by loyalty to the moshav as a whole; on the contrary, it is sustained, and provides an element of security and reassurance which *may* allow the lineage to enter into wider and workable overall self-government functions in concert with one or more other lineages. But it may not; and in that case the moshav may split irrevocably into autonomous lineage systems; or may withdraw from the effort, and allow an outside manager or instructor to organize non-traditional functions for the whole community; or one lineage may continue side by side with another in open hostility, but with limited bridging arrangements (e.g. on the economic side for marketing).

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[1] *Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa*, Ed: Carl Gösta Widstrand, Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 1970, & East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1971.

Still considering solidarity, Dore further observes that one necessity for successful Co-operative management is "institutionalized suspicion" – e.g. the auditor who checks the Treasurer's accounts or the Chairman's "expenses". In a system where lineage loyalties are strong, questioning an item on a fellow-lineageman's account may seem so unnatural as to be attributable only to bribery. In consequence, adequate auditing may break up the very sense of solidarity and security which is often said to be a necessity for successful co-operation.

A second difficulty, similar in kind, lies in the achievement of "democracy" in the Co-operative. Both the Sussex and Uppsala Seminar point out that, where the traditional society is strongly "vertical" in organization, an introduced Co-operative will be captured by the traditional magnates (Chiefs, Patrons, Lineage heads, dominant caste, landlord, money lender, etc.). Attempts to maintain co-operation while destroying the authoritarian element are likely to fail, because in Dore's words " . . . the cohesiveness and the authoritarianism are inextricably combined in the traditional structures, and the destruction of authority patterns is likely to lead immediately to a breakdown in solidarity too, and to the loss of what is supposed to be the initial advantage of traditional communities."

Indeed, there is a wide concensus that there is no easy takeover and continuity from the traditional forms of co-operative action into modern Co-operatives. This view was taken by J. M. Texier, Göran Hyden, and S. E. Migot-Adholla in the Uppsala Seminar, and repeated again in a later Paper in *Two Blades of Grass* by R. G. Crocombe (dealing with the Pacific Islands) who says "I am not aware of any traditional authority structure in the Pacific which could be carried over intact into Co-operatives". The fact is that a Co-operative involves different kinds of action, for different purposes, by people in different relationships with each other, from the kinds of action, purpose and relationship enshrined in traditional co-operative activity.

This does not mean that a transition into something new and largely discontinuous cannot be made. The search for some criteria of the conditions in which this can take place is, from a policy-maker's point of view, perhaps a little less negative than the destruction of the myth of smooth transition. J. S. Saul, in the concluding Paper ("Marketing Co-operatives in a developing Country") is observing an already transitional situation in which, after a few years of formal co-operative operation, "new men" emerge in the leadership and proceed to exploit the mass of humbler Co-operative members. From the point of view of official Tanzanian policy he points out that rigorous political action, with egalitarian objectives, might be thought necessary to correct this situation. "The average peasant must therefore be mobilized, "deparochialized," and related to his institutions in a new, more vital and egalitarian way". This point of view is really saying that traditional patterns of behaviour and authority, so far from giving a flying start to modern Co-operatives, are, in fact, inimical at least to the egalitarian/democratic ideal of Co-operation (though commercial success might be achieved, at least for a small group), and that, logically, a necessary first step is to destroy ("deparochialize") the traditional pattern to make room for a new one. There is, however, somewhat discouraging evidence from China in Shillinglaw's Paper.[2] The Communist government was determined to break down traditional family and lineage organization and even the traditional "standard market" (G. W. Skinner's phrase) around which village commercial organization was focussed in many parts of China. They did this by attempting to make "Communes" far larger than the standard market area, and by "collectives" which would replace lineage systems. After several changes of course, the Peking government was driven back, by 1961, to approving both the traditional village and the standard market area as the effective operational units. In one sense, tradition had won the battle; but no doubt, after years of drastic intervention and at high cost, the content and working behaviour within the traditional areas had been much changed.

There are, however, possibilities of compromise between a wholehearted acceptance of the idea of easy continuity, now discredited,[3] and a radical attempt to destructure the old society completely and rebuild on new lines. Perhaps the key word in compromise is "timing". T. F. Carroll ("Peasant Co-operation in Latin America") emphasizes that creation of Co-operatives, before a rewarding technical and commercial solution for small farmers is available, is premature, while to wait too long, when a private and competitive merchant system is well established, may be too late. Space prevents a proper assessment of this and a second Latin American Paper, partly because Latin America represents a special case, and perhaps a later stage of sophistication, which is not easily compared with African and Asian experience. But this observation by Carroll certainly confirms the writer's own tentative conclusion from experience – that Co-operatives are neither the tool of choice for the earliest approach to traditional societies, nor for the stage of well-developed commercial activity; their most useful phase is probably in the middle, transitional period, when at least a proportion of farmers are "progressive" but before the rural commercial economy is adequately developed.

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[2] "Traditional rural Co-operation and Social Structure: the Communist Chinese Collectivisation of agriculture". Geoffrey Shillinglaw.

[3] But it is discredited in the *Ujamaa* philosophy of Tanzania?

Weintraub's Israeli study has a more elaborate analysis of timing. His hypothesis is really in three parts. First, the familiarity of traditional relationships gives a *necessary* sense of security which enables members to consider modernizing changes without excessive fear and anxiety; second, that the traditional system must, nevertheless, be eventually replaced; third, that "continued stable development depends on the extent to which the traditional structure and solidarity recede, and hand over to other social principles in a gradual and controlled way – that is, neither disintegrate too soon nor linger on too long." Carroll also strongly underlines "gradualism."

Finally, before attempting a few comments on the argument of the book as a whole, it is worth mentioning the two Papers on Eastern Europe (Galeski and Shanin), since they concentrate on two alternatives to Co-operatives – Collective Farms and State Farms. Of particular interest is Shanin's point that small farmers want *either* freedom to farm autonomously as peasant producers *or* the security, wages and conditions of a State Farm made as near as possible to an industrial undertaking. The half-way house of partial loss of sovereignty in a Co-operative does not appeal. The other possible solution which combines autonomy and modern services without destroying the local tradition, may be in a development of Chayanov's concept of "vertical" co-operation, in which local outputs are handled by major commercial organizations at a higher level without insistence on horizontal organization at village level; this has been the most common compromise in Poland.

What help will all these Papers give to the administrator seeking criteria for choice of administrative and institutional methods? I have delayed mention of two Papers – by Leonard Joy and Raymond Apthorpe – which, in different ways, warn against generalization on such an issue. Apthorpe emphasizes the need to take far greater notice of *particular* social-economic factors, illustrating his case from an attempt to put pyrethrum production on a Co-operative basis, with the result that the male members of the Co-operative received the cash payments previously garnered by the women pickers. Joy, with more emphasis on technical and ecological factors, goes much further. He suggests that even a rough and ready attempt to classify social/economic/technical situations and rate them on a scale indicating more, or less, favourable conditions for introducing Co-operatives, is at present impossible, since the possible combinations of variables would run into thousands. At best, far more accurate and particular case studies would be needed before even gross and tentative conclusions could be drawn. This is certainly a formidable and real objection. It could, however, be argued that much of the raw material already exists, from 20 years or more of constant experiment over thousands of small schemes in three continents. The trouble is that this mass of raw material has never been tested even by the kind of general hypotheses which occur in this book, still less by analysis which takes technical and environmental factors as well as social factors into account. If, as I believe, it is not at present possible to apply reliable and much refined criteria to this issue, it is possible to avoid some of the grosser mistakes and to dispel some of the least tenable mythologies; and this book goes some way to do this.

To my mind, the greatest single lessons to be drawn from these Papers are three – and two are not explicitly drawn by the authors. The first, and most important, is the excessive tendency for administrators to seek to impose standard solutions, to manage and shape society rather than to facilitate its growth, to impose institutions first and analyse society, somewhat ruefully, afterwards. The early pages of the Israeli Paper show a fantastically detailed, cut-and-dried set of regulations and guidance which were imposed on moshavim. Donors, the U.N. agencies, and many others, do not weary in recommending Co-operatives, or some particular Credit policy, or Package Programmes, as nostrums of almost universal application, regardless of time and place: they are picked off the shelf and applied, with inevitable results. Far more sensitivity to the totality of local conditions - social, technical, economic – and far greater humility is a precondition of greater success. Texier has pointed out that the first phase may lie in small, informal groupings of like-minded farmers.

Second, the critical importance of timing – this is, indeed, mentioned in two papers.

Third, the conflict of ideology with economic success. The insistence on democracy and egalitarianism, which flows from so many Western advisers and from some local governments, may erect impossibly high barriers for societies which have not reached a point in their evolution where the experience, the skills, the minimum of economic security, the national unity, the central political will, the local political structure which are needed to work an egalitarian system are available. Heaven forfend that any responsible person should fail to enrol in mankind's constant struggle for a more just society. But justice has to be built in again and again, in every generation; as society grows and changes new opportunities for exploitation and new instruments to defeat it follow each other. The Lake Victoria Cotton Co-operative at Mwanza did much to help small farmers, and to reduce merchant exploitation in its early days: now, perhaps, it is corrupt and exploitative, and new instruments are needed. A single, permanent recipe for justice is likely either to freeze society in its tracks or be brushed aside or outflanked by the forces of social evolution. Eternal vigilance, yes; pre-planning of permanent justice, no.

One encouraging feature of these two books lies in the emergence of political scientists, sociologists, and students of public administration with practical and detailed work on the development process. For far too long economists, with their stranglehold on Planning departments, and their command of Aid funds – and, largely, research funds – have dominated development thinking, in far too many cases with a singularly a-historical and abstracted technique. Even the anthropologists, once supreme in the study of Africa at least, now so despised, may be able to come back to give a more rounded picture of the growth of human societies which are in so many ways unlike the Western industrial civilization in which so many commentators live.

Finally, with some diffidence, I suggest that any reader who shares my dismay in struggling through the editorial Introduction to this book should move quickly to the Papers: it would be the greatest pity to miss them. At least, let it be read last. One is sharply aware how great can be the differences in assessment between one person and another; and others may not find these 40 pages so long, meandering, awkward in style and politically prejudiced as I did. Journalistic cracks about "coupon-clippers" seem both a little antiquated and out of keeping with an otherwise scholarly and objective book, which will be of great value.

GUY HUNTER

Quarterly Notes

INTERNATIONAL – *Local Government in the Seventies*

The nature of the problems ahead can best be illustrated by the following figures of estimated population growth quoted in the 1970 Annual Report of the World Bank (in millions):

	1920	1960	2000
Urban			
More developed	200	450	900
Less developed	70	310	1,400
Rural and small towns			
More developed	470	530	500
Less developed	1,120	1,710	3,200
Total world population	1,860	3,000	6,000

A gigantic effort will have to be made in order to provide the millions of new city dwellers with housing, health services, education and employment.

Conclusions

Local Government seems to be caught in a net of conflicting demands. If local units are to provide services effectively and economically their size has to be large. Yet there is a need for communities "on a human scale". Scientific and technical methods have to be used to solve many of the problems confronting government. At the same time, the individual should be able to understand and influence governmental decisions. Financial and economic requirements call for centralized allocation of resources. Yet, room for local initiative is essential for economic, social and cultural development.

Source: J. G. van Putten, writing in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3

UNITED NATIONS – *Assistance to Local Governments*

Whilst current problems of structure, finance, inter-governmental relationships, administrative procedures, will continue – probably for all time – other problems are going to loom larger than in the past, particularly those arising from urbanization, the great metropolitan city and the need to provide through agro-urban centres for a better life in the rural areas. Whilst these can easily be identified, new situations will arise from changing social pressures from technological innovations.

The recommended UN approach means a global manpower budget, a structured international collaborative training programme with special emphasis upon *management development, human relations, and the stimulation of that questing, questioning attitude which makes men challenge their own* *objectives*. Whilst other needs in materials and structure will be needed to meet future situations, trained men will always be required and their training should equip them to look ahead, detect nascent needs and adjust to meet them.

Source: Henry Maddick writing in the *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3.

INTERNATIONAL – *Rehovot Conference on Urbanization in Developing Countries*, 16–24 *August*, 1971.

The following extracts have been made from the admirably produced and succinct report of the Conference:

The question of the political and power structure, and its effect on the development of country areas, was raised by Dr. Thomas Carol, of the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington. The cultivator, the peasant, was doubly exploited. The landlords and administrators exploited him; so did the marketing system. The agricultural surplus was taken away from him in some way or another.

The reason why this was possible was that the peasant was politically powerless. Israel was an example where the opposite was true, where, for historical reasons, farmers had always had great political influence; the result was that there was planning for the countryside. Hence he concluded that it was essential in most developing countries to have agrarian reform in the most massive sense, combined with a shift in the power structure so as to give the peasants political influence.

The Hon. Ram C. Malhotra, Nepal, pointed out how strange it was that the peasants were politically powerless, because in most developing lands they constituted over 80 per cent of the population. The trouble was that the peasants in a sense could be said to live in the past, in a feudal type of society. They were not educated in the same way as the urban élite was educated. Hence a great gap developed between them.

Dealing with the "push" from the country to the city, Mr. Malhotra stressed that he believed that country folk had a great love for the countryside, a tremendous attachment to the land. But, as families got bigger and land was sub-divided, it could not support everyone in the family, and surplus workers went off to the cities.

. . . There had been four themes: the role of urbanization, development, the effect on the environment, and possible solutions to problems. It was generally agreed that cities were instruments for social change and that they gave people an opportunity for advancement. Industrialization and urbanization went hand in hand, so cities contributed to national development. On the other hand, it was realized that man should not continue to disregard needs of his environment: he had to use the know-how, which is available to him, to control environmental pollution of all kinds.

. . . On the whole it had been agreed that the size of cities meant power and strength, despite many adverse features of the metropolis. There was a feeling, although it was not unanimous, that it was better to decentralize, and everybody agreed that the people must feel involved in the drive for development goals. It was felt that housing standards should be changed to suit the means available; it was no good offering champagne instead of bread to a hungry man.

One group believed that the size of the metropolis should be carefully worked out, as well as its relationship to the surrounding countryside; it should function as a regional city. Social, political and cultural factors should be taken into account. The power structure should be carefully evaluated. Planning policies were neither good nor bad in themselves; the real test was implementation.

. . . Plenary meetings had considered the "pull" of the city and the "push" of the farm, and had come to the conclusion that the process was virtually unstoppable. Nor were they convinced that it should be stopped; there were horrors in the country as well as in the city. Cities in developing countries were marked by a dualism, the bazaar economy and the firm type economy, which caused an imbalance. Economic efficiency also led to imbalances, because it demanded concentration at the expense of the periphery.

PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA – *Land Reform*

The Australian Government and the Administration of Papua and New Guinea are at present involved in a major policy review of land tenure in the Territory. The Administration has been seeking to improve existing legislative provisions so as to develop a code of land tenure laws which can be built upon by a future indigenous government.

Land tenure is recognized as one of the most complex and vital issues facing the Administration of the Territory. Some of the main reasons for this are—

> 97 per cent of all land in Papua and New Guinea is held under customary tenure. Broadly this is based on a form of shifting subsistence cropping which is considered inadequate as a basis for the economic development needed to sustain the expectations of the people;
>
> only 3 per cent of all territory land is alienated either in freehold or as Administration land, but 43 per cent of land in the densely populated Gazelle area has been alienated (mainly during German Administration) and this has highlighted problems of cultural transition, disputes over the validity of early land purchases and disputes over the ownership of customary land are numerous. Many remain unresolved and this leads to insecurity of tenure and discontent over land rights.

The land area of Papua and New Guinea is 178,260 sq. miles. Of this, 850 sq. miles (less than one-half per cent) is freehold land held under plantations by expatriate interests. The Administration owns 1,300 sq. miles and 5,000 sq. miles are held under lease by indigenes and expatriates.

The vast bulk of the Territory (97 per cent of the land area) is still held by the indigenous people under customary systems of land tenure.

There has been no large-scale alienation of land, except in the Gazelle Peninsula during German times. The problems of expatriate settlement in Kenya and Algeria have been avoided.

Broadly, customary tenure is based upon shifting cultivation and varies widely as between clans and different parts of the Territory. Quite often individuals or groups of people have rights to various portions of land. For example, although a group might own an area of land, individuals have rights to particular trees on the land and even to different uses of the same trees. One man might be entitled to collect coconuts from a palm, while another man has the right to cut fronds from it and in turn the tree belongs to someone else.

The policy put into effect by legislation introduced in 1963, was based on the premises that development could not take place on native land held under customary tenure (which is specifically designed for a subsistence economy) and that, as agriculture would be the basis of the Territory's economy for the foreseeable future, changes were required to ensure economic progress.

While this legislation enabled some land to be brought into economic use through acquisition by the Administration and subsequent leasing (5,000 sq. miles) it was not particularly successful in achieving conversion of customary land to individual titles.

Following advice received from the British Land Tenure Adviser (Mr. Rowton Simpson) the Administration has announced that the proposed legislation, which has been the subject of consultation with the Administrator's Executive Council, will provide for—

a single register of title and the procedures for all transactions in land,

a new system and procedures for determining customary ownership, and converting customary ownership to individual title in specially selected areas,

a new system for determining ownership and registering customary land in single parcels outside specially selected areas,

registration of customary groups so that they could be registered as owners of land and

a system of control by local bodies over transactions in land.

GREENLAND – *Urban Planning*

Town planning in Greenland has had difficulty in keeping pace with rapid development. But it has in recent years been greatly intensified; there are now hard-and-fast development plans for most major townships, providing a good working foundation for politicians, planners, and technicians.

In a country where low temperatures, snow, gales and darkness are major factors, township and dwelling must give shelter and security. The actual buildings must be stout, sturdy and protective. Urban developments must provide shelter, enclosing and sheltering central parts and allowing other parts open access to sea, view, and occupation. Town planners and architects are endeavouring to give each township an identity of its own by adjusting various elements in it to the special characteristics of the locality.

This is what the planners have envisaged, for example, at Godthab, Greenland's largest township. It is situated on a promontory, with lengthwise the contours of ridges, formed by ice action in the glacial period. The directions of road system and buildings will be planned to follow this general line, which moreover is favourable to prevailing winds and utilization of sunshine in houses and offices. On the mountain tops there is an unrivalled but bare view; in the sheltered valleys between the ridges, rich vegetation. All this will be turned to account in the planning. The level plain in the centre of the township, formerly a green swamp, will be used for industrialized house-building, schools, institutions, and town centre. The town centre is envisaged as heated, under-cover shopping streets, surmounted by offices. The estimated population in 1975 is 15,000, the limit set by the area at present available. New areas will need to be inaugurated after 1975.

Source: *Local Government Abroad*, September, 1971, No. 101.

Book Reviews

ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GOVERNMENT LENDING: THE REGIONAL LOANS BOARDS OF NIGERIA, by SAYRE P. SCHATZ, *N.I.S.E.R., Ibadan: Oxford University Press*, 1970; XIV, 146 pp.

One of the areas of near-universal agreement among development economists is the important role of capital in economic development. It is precisely for this reason that in the less-developed countries, it has been the objective of public policy to direct considerable attention towards the alleviation of capital shortage both for private and public investment. It is the attempt to realize this objective which led the Nigerian Regional Governments to the setting up in the early 'fifties of certain specialized development institutions – the Regional Loans Boards.

After a period of considerable neglect despite their strategic role in the process of economic development, the Nigerian Loans Boards became recently the subject of detailed and systematic study by economists. The volume by Professor Schatz, which is his second on the subject, is one of them.

This study which is the most thorough and well documented that has yet been undertaken covers only the lending activities of the Regional Loans Boards of Nigeria from their formation in 1949 until the *coup* of January, 1966. The clarity of exposition and the depth of analysis exhibited in the study are all a reflection of Professor Schatz's deep inside knowledge of the workings of these institutions which he acquired during his period of stay in Nigeria as a research scholar. He has undoubtedly put this to good use to the benefit of the Nigerian public at large.

After a brief account of the historical development of the Regional Loans Boards which he undertakes in the first chapter of the book, Professor Schatz proceeds to make a comprehensive review of their lending activities in the remaining seven chapters. His account in this connection makes very unhappy reading. Apart from the revelations of nepotism and corruption in the operations of these institutions, the most disappointing aspect of their lending activities is the waste of public funds occasioned by the high incidence of default on the part of borrowers. This aspect of the Boards' operations is worth emphasizing because, as the author has rightly remarked, "Probably the best single index of the health of a loans programme is the repayment record. It reflects the combined result of the competence with which the Loans Board was run, and the ability of the private sector of the economy to make use of the programme" (p. 90). Judged by this criterion the Regional Loans Boards failed.

The inability of borrowers to repay loans is directly the outcome of the dismal failures of the many private ventures that were financed out of borrowed funds from the Boards. "To some degree, the unsatisfactory collection records reflects a high rate of business failure" (p. 120). Professor Schatz attributes these failures to a number of factors. The first is what has now become known as the "Schatz thesis" in the literature of the subject. This is the attempt to trace the origin of business failures partly to the shortage of commercially viable projects which is broadly interpreted to include the shortage of entrepreneurial or managerial ability. Many private ventures according to Professor Schatz were unsuccessful for this reason. Other factors are traceable to the lending practices of the Boards themselves. One is the extent to which political factors influenced their lending decisions. Because their lending activities were often coloured by political motives rather than purely economic considerations, many loans were granted for projects which were of doubtful commercial viability; the result was, of course, failures and inability to repay borrowed capital. Where the political factor was absent, it was often difficult for the Boards to ascertain the commercial viability of many projects before loans were approved for their operations. The reason for this was the lack of qualified personnel on the part of the Boards to carry out thorough viability appraisals. One further factor has to do with the inability of the Boards to supervise effectively the expenditures of loan funds. This is reflected in the many cases of misapplication of loan funds.

The foregoing disappointing experience of the Nigerian Regional Loans Boards has led Professor Schatz to question very seriously the economic justification for the allocation of public funds through lending institutions for aiding private business ventures: "It can therefore be argued that better use would be made of the country's resources if the Loans Boards were discontinued altogether and the funds devoted to other programmes to assist private enterprise" (p. 129).

If anything, this volume has effectively demonstrated that the availability of capital funds, no matter how strategic its role in getting a less-developed country into the stage of self-sustaining growth, is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic advancement. In other words, even if capital funds are available in the right amounts, its optimal use cannot be ensured if it is allocated according to criteria other than economic.

F. AKIN OLALOKU

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RESETTLEMENT. Kariba Studies IV, by Elizabeth Colson; *Manchester University Press for Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia*, 1971; map, tables, bibliography, index; pp. xi, 277; paperback £1.80, hardback £4.20.

When the building of the Kariba Dam was decided on, the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (now the Institute of African Studies in the University of Zambia) arranged that a survey should be made of a sample of villages before and after the resettlement that the flooding would necessitate. Dr. Colson and Dr. Thayer Scudder carried out these studies, taking the populations of four Gwembe Tonga neighbourhoods, and they intend to revisit them at some future time. No resettled population can have been so closely documented.

Some 34,000 people in Zambia had their homes submerged. As with all such schemes, the time-table – and other arrangements too – had to fall in with the decisions of the engineers. Administrative officers had carefully chosen, with some popular consultation, the areas to which displaced people should be moved. Then they were brusquely informed that the height of the water was to be raised a further twenty feet and all these chosen settlement areas would be flooded. Their credit never recovered from the popular belief that they had made promises and broken them. The move had to be a concerted operation, at a time when numbers of lorries could be made available for transport; hence its timing depended on the inexorable rise of the water to flood the lowest levels, but the villages higher up could not be left until their people could see the need to move.

Robert Chambers has argued that the most successful resettlement schemes are those which leave as much as possible to the initiative of the settlers. The Kariba scheme was of this kind, and the work of building and clearing called for all the manpower available and diverted the young men from the wage employment they usually sought in the period after harvest.

Most people hated their first years in their new homes. There were some actual epidemics with high mortality, but what reinforced the idea that the land was cursed by the sorcery of its earlier inhabitants was the fact that populations were much more concentrated and so every individual heard of more deaths than would have come to ear in the scattered pre-Kariba dam communities. Dr. Colson's description of the actual move is heartrending. Some people refused to go; a riot developed, with loss of life.

Yet by 1965 these troubles, though not forgotten, were no more than memories. So perhaps the horrors of the removal can be shrugged off on the scale of history. Perhaps.

The latter part of Dr. Colson's book, however, is concerned with the new social system that the migrants have evolved, and particularly with their response to new economic opportunities. The Gwembe were exceptionally isolated before the move. The roads built to transport them and their goods formed a new link with the world outside, and development policies of various kinds created salaried employment which in its turn produced a new élite of teachers and technical assistants, consciously cultivating a higher standard of life. There was more commitment to wage labour as long as there was a demand for it, but government schemes to diversify the local economy were on the whole unsuccessful. Some people explicitly preferred poverty with freedom to higher standards with government interference.

Dr. Colson's account of local administration as seen through Gwembe eyes is one of the best we have had. Alas, it does not support the optimistic theory of the '50s that there was everywhere a pool of enthusiasm for development that only needed to be tapped by creating elected local authorities. Whatever the form of local administration, Gwembe saw it as European interference, doubtless with some ulterior motive. The exceptions were the men who staffed the local council office, who were beginning to show initiative in the development of the minor services within their scope. But an operation on the scale of the resettlement inevitably by-passed them;

their task was to advocate the move, and this earned them the distrust and active hostility of the villagers. "The growth of a viable local governing body was one of the casualties of the Kariba scheme."

LUCY MAIR

FUNCTIONING OF VILLAGE PANCHAYATS, by N. R. INAMDAR, *Bombay Popular Prakashan;* map, tables, index; pp. 368; Rs. 32.00.

Mr. Inamdar provides a study of four village Panchayats in Maharashtra State. Two, each with a population exceeding 3,300 – one fortunate to be a pilgrimage centre and to attract a Fair tax, the other less viable but exhibiting civic virtues (so as to win the prize for the best Panchayat in the State), have proved themselves as reasonably successful local authorities. The other two each with a smaller population, no staff, negligible income, rate as virtually complete failures.

To the Dehu Panchayat some 200 pages are devoted and 55 to the Dhamni, and it is appropriate that these two larger bodies which provide a reasonable service for their people should be studied in the greater detail since they offer the examples of success that might be followed elsewhere.

> In these two better village Panchayats the author noted: a good standard of leadership – knowledgeable and democratic; a readiness to undertake self-help schemes with a structural content; co-operatives functioning reasonably well. A more reasonable (but not entirely liberal) attitude towards scheduled castes and tribal people.
>
> Other aspects of community development had made insufficient progress; social education, women's activities, cottage industries, etc., agricultural techniques had tended to want for leadership-initiative.

As to the non-viable little Panchayats of Rahatwade and Khadakwasla, the former it is suggested might well be merged with a larger and successful village Panchayat with which it borders; for the latter some hope is seen that the local women's efforts may stimulate the Panchayat to a better performance. This village has lost a lot of land for state purposes and also, for a village as close as eleven miles to Poona, its Village Council is a surprisingly recent one set up in 1958, and so no doubt, merits further time in which to justify itself.

Overall Mr. Inamdar does not paint a very encouraging picture, nonetheless it is one that is not without hope. He emphasizes the need for adequate secretaryship and adequate extension service support if Village Panchayats are to become effective bodies for development purposes. He firmly believes in these grassroots units of democracy and many would agree that where there is real potential the greater responsibility and greater power to draw on needed resources, which the author recommends, could be a major means of furthering rural development at village level.

P.H.J.

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS IN INDIA, by C. P. BHAMBHRI; *Vikas Publications, Delhi,* 1971; pp. 349; Rs. 36.

Dr. Bhambhri's work adds to the growing literature on the interaction of administrators and elected politicians a study of their relations at the cabinet minister and permanent secretary level. His thesis is that they are at present characterized by an imbalance in favour of the civil servants which stems from weaknesses within the political system.

The first three chapters outline the current state of Indian politics and give useful information on the backgrounds of members of the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Civil Service. A valuable summary is provided of the ways in which the Indian parliament can scrutinize administrative processes. The core of the book is a series of five case studies of situations where Dr. Bhambhri considers bureaucratic power to have been excessive. In all but one case, a ministerial resignation was involved. The most detailed study is of the notorious Life Insurance Corporation affair in 1957, in which a public corporation was induced to buy shares in firms of dubious stability. The others concern V. K. Krishna Menon's relations with senior military officers, an agreement in 1963 between All-India Radio and the Voice of America, Lal Bahadur Shastri's relations with his expert advisers when he was Prime Minister, and the agitation against the slaughter of cows, in 1966, which led to police firing. The final chapter draws some comparisons between India, France, and Italy, and makes some suggestions for improving democratic control over civil servants.

Undoubtedly bureaucratic power expands to fill a political vacuum, but one may question how far the case studies do in fact reveal the civil servants concerned to be attempting to arrogate government powers. At times Dr. Bhambhri's analysis seems polemical rather than dispassionate. This is the more serious in that in a number of the cases, particularly the Life Insurance Corporation affair, several interpretations of the available facts are possible and the full "inside story" of minister-secretary relations may never be told. A further criticism of the case studies chosen is that in at least three of them the situations appear to have arisen largely as a result of inadequate communication channels between the two sides. Only the case of Shastri and his advisers seems wholly relevant to Dr. Bhambhri's stated concerns.

Underlying the weaknesses of the case study material is a failure to explore fully the nature of the relationship between ministers and civil servants. To assert that bureaucracy must function under the complete control and directions of the political leadership is to beg the question of how much discretion civil servants should have in translating policy into action. If civil servants should, as Dr. Bhambhri implies, be committed to developmental objectives, what contribution should they make to policy formation? The case study of Krishna Menon and the army raises the problem of what rights civil servants should have to protect their legitimate interests. These and similar questions remain unanswered.

Despite the defects of the main part of the work, Dr. Bhambhri makes some useful suggestions which can be taken separately. He makes the point that a minister whose own position within his party or whose party's position within a coalition is generally known to be weak is at a disadvantage in getting his own way with his ministry. The remedy lies in the evolution of a more stable party system. It will be interesting to see the success that the "Young Turks" in Mrs. Gandhi's present cabinet have in implementing their programmes. Dr. Bhambhri also suggests that ministers should have expert advisers from within their party organizations. It is possible, however, that this might accentuate policy divisions within party ranks.

DAVID TAYLOR

THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND TENURE IN BUGANDA SINCE 1896, by H. W. WEST; *African Social Research Documents*, Vol. 2; pp. 102; £1.25.

This attractively produced little book is the second in a series entitled African Social Research Documents, published by the Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, Holland, in association with the African Studies Centre, University of Cambridge, with the object of making available to research workers published and unpublished material to which they would not otherwise have easy access. The book presupposes that the reader will have some initial familiarity with the subject.

No one could be better equipped than Dr. West to select and present such material on Ganda land tenure. He has practical experience of the subject, having worked for many years in Buganda first as a divisional surveyor and assistant registrar of titles and later as Assistant Commissioner of Lands and Surveys. He is the author of "The Mailo System in Buganda" (Government Printer, Entebbe, 1965) and his more detailed study entitled "Land Policy in Buganda" is shortly to be published by the Cambridge University Press.

Although Ganda land tenure is comparatively well documented, it remains a promising field for further study. As Dr. West writes in his short introduction: "Since 1900 Buganda has been the scene of one of the most interesting and informative experiments in "land tenure engineering" in tropical Africa. The political, social, economic and administrative consequences of this hasty and ill-conceived attempt have attracted a great deal of attention and from this experiment many lessons are still to be learned". This introduction is followed by a concise commentary (six pages) on each of the twenty-four documents presented.

Dr. West's choice of the documents, which comprise the main part of the book, is excellent. His claim in the introduction that "together they outline a case study in the interaction of English and Ganda notions of property" is certainly justified. The first three documents, made before the Uganda Agreement was signed in 1900, consist of an index of all land dealings between 1896 and 1899 and two deeds, in one of which the Kabaka (King) Mwanga confirmed his free cession of Entebbe to the British Government in 1894. Although the text of the Uganda Agreement of 1900 is easily available to research workers, Dr. West has included acticles 15–17 of the Agreement as his fourth document; the inclusion is justified to complete the case study. The next group of documents throws interesting light on the procedures adopted for implementation of the land settlement. It contains examples of the various forms used, allocation lists, lists of *butaka* (clan) lands and an example of an *endagaano*, the form of agreement which the Baganda themselves devised, contrary to the provisions of the registration law, for the transfer of *mailo* land. Then follow some leading cases on *butaka* land. The final group consists of various memoranda and reports, mainly by Government officials, on various aspects of land tenure in Buganda and contains the memorandum on land registration by Mr. V. L. O. Sheppard of 1938 in which he warns that "if the existing practice of transfer by private deed (*endagaano*) in plain disobedience to the law is allowed to continue, the Register will become a record of caveats unauthorised by law rather than a record of registered rights to land." Some sixteen years elapsed before the necessary reforms in this respect were put in hand, and Dr. West played an active part in them.

For good measure the author has added a selected bibliography to his book. His selection is arbitrary and by no means all the works included relate directly to the subject of the book or even to Uganda. This bibliography is, however, likely to be of the greatest use to research workers and is a valuable addition.

J. C. D. LAWRANCE

REPORTING AFRICA IN AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL MASS MEDIA, Ed. OLAV STOKKE; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden,* 1971; pp. 224.

LIBRARIES IN EAST AFRICA, Ed. ANNA-BRITTA WALLENIUS; *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden,* 1971; pp. 219.

The first of these two books consists of papers delivered at a seminar on "Reporting Africa", which was organized in October, 1970, by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Most of the participants were journalists actively reporting from or in Africa, but a few researchers in mass media also participated. For the critical reader of newspapers it is rather confusing to find that the common theme of the journalist speakers seems to have been this: considering the difficult working conditions to which we are subjected, we are doing a pretty good job – while, of course, those in other countries or on other papers do not succeed so well. It is also strange to find that although radio and television are the potential *mass* media in Africa, the interest of those who are actually committed to this media in Africa seems mainly to have been devoted to the printed word.

Perhaps the most readable of the papers delivered at the seminar are those submitted by Colin Legum of the London *Observer*, who is very outspoken about the often frustrating situations which face a journalist reporting from Africa, and by Professor Ulf Himmelstrand who, from the social scientist's point of view, seeks to make his observations on mass media performance in Africa the basis for theoretical discussion.

The most rewarding contributions however, are Olav Stokke's introduction on *The Mass Media in Africa and Africa in the Mass Media,* and his summary *Mass Communication in Africa – Freedoms and Functions.* As Mr. Stokke correctly observes, it is not sufficient to make a simple distinction between "closed" and "open" societies when attempting to explain the lack of or the existence of "press freedom". Mr. Stokke also tries to give better shape to that concept, by suggesting relevant qualifications to the use of such phrases as of "the right to be just or unjust" (Beard) or "freedom from compulsions" (Hocking). The mass media are, as for example Colin Legum says, institutions of the political systems to which they belong. But few contributors to the seminar seem to have drawn the ultimate, and logical, conclusion: that being so then complete freedom of the press which all agree is a good thing, never can exist. Freedom of the press is relative to the political system in which one works, i.e. divergent opinions may only be expressed so long as they do not seriously contribute to the mobilization of an opinion which would threaten the prevalent political system or, for countries less committed to parliamentary government would threaten the ruling clique and its position of power. Thus Ahmed Baba Miske of *AfricAsia* describes the mass media as "a means by which one class imposes its ideology, and exerts its power. No conscientious person thinks that the "bourgeoisies" never use these media for themselves."

Of course, there still remains much to be done within to-day's political systems, both in African media which could serve as watch-dogs, and in non-African media which should try to make available to the public being served *good* news from Africa besides other news items. However, the African journalist who has internationalized "professional" attitudes will find it difficult to act as a watch-dog when his sponsor is either the government, or a foreign company dependent on the goodwill of the government. And as long as accounts of turmoil and violence take up a large part of the "news value", there is little chance that peaceful and progressive African events should catch much attention in the European media.

Libraries in East Africa is also the result of a conference held by the Scandinavian Institute. In her introductory essay, Rede Perry-Widstrand makes an attempt to answer the question *Library Services – for Whom?* African libraries may meet the demands made of them, but as long as they do not themselves help to create new demands, without being tied to universities or to the central administration, they are bound to remain islands of learning in a sea of ignorance. Ignorance and illiteracy are of course only two, but closely related aspects of under-development. The literacy acquired in the expanding school systems of East Africa should be kept alive, and without an effective net of public and mobile libraries this is an impossible task. The costs of books or newspapers cannot be afforded by the ordinary African peasant farmer or worker.

But the problems to be solved are immense. Some 90 per cent of the East African population is living in rural areas, and the population is too dispersed until something like the *ujamaa* villages of Tanzania becomes more of a rule than an exception. From this follows the problem of transportation. Governments in Africa can only afford a few village libraries, and will for long have to rely upon mobile libraries, i.e. boxes with books put on a Landrover which serves as a peripatetic library. But to cover a country of great geographical extent like Tanzania, where this system is being tried, one needs a fleet of Landrovers with drivers-librarians. In Tanzania the District Adult-education Organisers are supposed to fulfil these functions. But what books can be supplied P. J. Mhaiki estimates that there are only about 500 titles in Swahili, the national language in both Tanzania and Kenya.

One tends to get the impression that these problems are recognized, but are not very seriously dealt with. About one-third of this book is devoted to the more sophisticated problems of university libraries. It is perhaps symptomatic that all the photographs illustrating the book are of university libraries or of town libraries in East African capitals. Such libraries look much the same wherever they are.

This has been, perhaps, rather an unfair account of the contents of *Libraries in East Africa.* Some detailed reports on the development of the East African library services, a perceptive round-table discussion on adult education and library work in Tanzania, and a survey of recent African bibliography also receive attention. Several authors stress that libraries should not limit their activities to dealing with books, but that they actively should take part in literacy campaigns, and in political, economic, social and practical education, using also audio-visual material, pamphlets, etc. But again, this requires a new type of librarianship, books that can be understood by villagers, and above all strong support from East African governments and from aid organizations in donor countries.

The task, which should be common to both journalists and librarians in Africa, is to transform their respective media from class media to mass media.

ROBIN CHEESMAN

THE NIGERIAN MILITARY, by Robin Luckham; *Cambridge University Press*, 1971; appendices and index; pp. 371; £6.00.

We have here a meticulously researched and reasoned analysis, accurate within the acknowledged limits of pp. 10–13, of Nigeria's pre-war (1967, not 1939; Nigeria's historians now need to be doubly beware of their ethnocentric baselines) officer corps. Dr. Luckham presents us with the behavioural patterns of the Nigerian military élite, no more than 250 strong in a population of 50 million, which functioned as a self-imaged, self-aware - in élitist and ethnic terms -group and which was to condition not only the conduct of the army but also the military's response to the pressures of the political kingdom. As befits a study of authority and revolt developed from an American Ph.D. (despite first Chicago and now Harvard, Dr. Luckham is fully English), the text is shot through with the idiom of transatlantic sociology, but this need rarely deter and never defeat the determined reader.

A short introductory chapter states the problem in the context of Janowitz/Huntington/Finer theory on civil-military relations, reformulated by Luckham to allow his own conceptual framework of viewing the

Nigerian army (by which he really means the officers) as a social system in its own right, "with definable boundaries across which transactions with its political and social environment take place" (p. 7). This is followed by an historical chapter each on the January and the July coups of 1966, in which Luckham chronicles the now received version (including giving the lie to the official Lagos explanation of why the Quarter-Master General was murdered) of the traumatic events of those nights of the long knives. He also suggests that Ojukwu did not settle for secession until as late as March, 1967. We then come to the heart of the matter, Dr. Luckham's interpretation of the Nigerian military as a social system *eo nomine*. Having shared with him the privilege of honorary membership of the Army mess and the many friendships that this engendered, this reviewer finds much of the theorising and most of the empirical findings attractive and persuasive. In a short review of this nature, the chapter headings and sub-headings themselves adequately convey how Luckham saw the pre-war officer corps – "officers and gentlemen," "the image of an élite," "peer groups," "of heroism and hierarchy," "tribe and region" – and their contribution to the dynamics of primordial conflict in the army. The final section takes us back once more to the better-known territory of political history, the Ironsi régime, and the slide towards secession.

Appendix I and the index of senior officers, conspirators and politicians connected with the army, are valuable reference tools. This reviewer regrets, however, that it was not correlated with Table 4 and a different type used to indicate those murdered before July, 1967. In this connection, it is useful to complete Luckham's biographical lists by entering the recent verdict of the Federal Military Government on those 150 regular officers who for one reason or another fought with the Biafran forces. Nor is this reviewer clear why this Appendix reduces its value by stopping at the 1961 "cohort" (this Romish term is defined at p. 134). This deprives it of that significant "Disappointed Dozen," the group of Southern graduates whose commissions into the infantry were cancelled at the direct intervention of the Minister of Defence (they were offered the education corps instead) and whose understandable resentment was such a pointer to those reading the signs of the politics of Nigerianization among the military and bureaucratic élite. The footnote at p. 126 is thus incomplete. Exceptionally, there is no bibliography: very full references in footnotes do service instead. Dr. Luckham must be the first British academic to write on the military in African politics without citing the work of W. Gutteridge (p. 363).

Provided one accepts – and this reviewer does – the model of an officer corps as a social system and the worthwhileness of a close study of an African élite, there is little to criticize in Luckham's analysis. Since his book is likely to remain an authoritative document (with Luckham and N. Miners in print and M. J. Dent in draft, there is surely very little juice to be squeezed out of the lemon of the Nigerian officer corps up to 1967), it may be in order to set the record straight on a couple of minor items of "Murtala" and Lt.-Col. "Kur" Mohammed never was "Kuru" – forms accuracy. Lt.-Col. "Muritala" has never been the accepted form of that appear consistently wrong throughout the narrative. Dr. Luckham's estimate of Major Ifeajuna as an "honourable" man (p. xii) is startlingly at variance with the description of his behaviour in the unpublished Lagos Special Branch report, which Luckham has seen; and indeed with his own description of Ifeajuna's base treachery that January night. With 1967 as the cut-off point, an officer like Madiebo, who became Chief of Staff of the Biafran army, is apparently too junior a figure (though a cohort-peer of Gowon's) to earn a place among the hundred *dramatis personae* that make up Luckham's essential élite.

Anyone interested in political Nigeria, and presumably sociologists with specialism in other countries, must be glad that Dr. Luckham thought again after those frequent occasions "when I wondered whether I should have written at all, making grim events the subject of the intellectual games played by a social scientist" (p. xi). With Nigeria publicly committed to another five years of military government, this study may, besides illuminating the past, further our understanding of what makes the officers charged with administering the present tick. If, as seems likely, the research emphasis on the military in Africa will soon shift away from studies of their aspirations and advent on the political scene to those of their impact and the delicate back-to-barracks process and problems, there seems to be no doubt that the interest in the behaviour of such a conspicuously élitist group as the officer corps will persist now that they have stamped their mark so indelibly on Africa's politics. In the literature of the African military, Dr. Luckham's book is likely to retain a deservedly prominent place.

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

Book Notes

FARMING SYSTEMS IN THE TROPICS, by HANS RUTHENBERG; *Clarendon Press, Oxford*, 1971; plates, bibliography, index; pp. 313; £5.50.

Professor Ruthenberg has produced a major new text book for students of tropical agriculture. His sensible appreciation of basically peasant agriculture is well summarized in the following passages: "Despite the difficulties of the natural environment, and the limitations that arise from unfavourable price relations, unstable markets, and the traditional socio-institutional conditions of agricultural production in low-income countries, tropical farming, which is mainly smallholder farming, is a dynamic business, in which small but numerous adjustments are continually being made to the production processes. Tropical farmers are experienced in adapting their systems and methods of production to different circumstances, albeit slowly and with only a limited success in making major technical discoveries . . . production can be transformed from its traditional pattern to a more productive and beneficial level. That substantial changes can be brought about through the application of modern technology has been shown countless times. This possibility should not mask the fact that innovation and change, however slow, are normal features of traditional farming."

Tropical countries are littered with the remains of agricultural schemes initiated by keen well qualified agronomes which, alas, failed for one reason or another, and understandably, the peasant whose very existence depends on his obtaining a harvest, needs some substantial evidence that new techniques *will* work before he places his livelihood at risk. Given the proof, given the incentive of markedly better income and/or security few peasants will eschew change, change, that is, for the better.

The book is full of admirably produced diagrams and lucid tables. Besides, the coloured plates are particularly well chosen; buffaloes trampling paddy fields in Ceylon, the remarkable root systems of grasses developed by the research unit of the former Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation at Kongwa – an horrific plate of gulley erosion in Kondoa-Irangi could have made an interesting addendum.

This book will be of value to many students, and in particular to those who, under technical or other schemes, plan to offer their services to the agricultural departments of a developing tropical country.

LAND USE, 1972, by D. R. DENMAN & SYLVIO PRODANO; *George Allen & Unwin;* pp. 230; £4.

This book introduces a new analytical philosophy of land use, evolved and refined over the last ten years but here presented in whole for the first time. This philosophy is based on the argument that the fundamental unit in land use planning is the proprietary land unit. Governments may plan general principles and criteria of land use, but it is at the lower level of the proprietary land unit that all critical decisions are taken. Proprietary land use analysis "introduces a new approach to the decision-making framework of land ownership, with the objective of confining local variations to standard categories and avoiding the ambiguities associated with juridical notions of ownership and the peculiarities of land tenure systems."

The work is of relevance to all lawyers, economists and planners concerned with land. It is not all theory; chapter XII contains a useful illustrative study of the application of proprietary land use analysis focussed on the use of land for forestry in England and Wales.

PEACEFUL CHANGE IN MODERN SOCIETY, Ed. E. BERKELEY TOMKINS; *The Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, California;* pp. 158; $6.50.

Including the editor's introduction, this volume comprising twelve essays, provides the outcome of the Hoover Institution's fiftieth anniversary conference on the book's title theme.

Contributors include seven leading American and one French academic, and four statesmen, one each from Australia, Britain, Norway and the United States.

It will suffice here to quote from the editor's reference to the paper by William A. Pollard – physicist and theologian. "For the first time in history," Pollard states, "men everywhere are beginning to sense that their planet, the earth, is finite, small, and limited in its capacity to support them." The earth's burgeoning population, which is increasing in geometric progression, is placing enormous and potentially insuperable demands on the earth's resources of fresh air and water, food, energy, and basic minerals. Many resources are already in short supply and with the increasing needs caused by the expanding population may, within only a few decades, reach the point of exhaustion.

Disagreeing with those who predict that further technological advances will solve these problems, Pollard postulates that the industrial-technological revolution of the past two centuries is rapidly coming to an end, and in retrospect from the twenty-first century it will be viewed as "a brief and profligate joy ride – a fleeting instance in the long history of man and his planet."

An appreciable reduction of the rate of population increase will alleviate, but will not eliminate, the basic threat that many vital natural resources may be exhausted. Thus in the future a fundamental ethical and practical problem with strong implications for the peace of the world will be how to apportion the limited resources – "the Commons" – which all mankind must share and utilize, and how to understand and practise a "morality of scarcity."

"If warfare is to be avoided and peace maintained for the remainder of this century, these are the moral imperatives which must increasingly demand our best thought and action."

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION, by JAMES C. SCOTT; *Prentice Hall, New Jersey*; bibliography, index; pp. 166;

In the dialogue with developing countries, courtesy for one thing, self-consciousness for another, have kept to an absurdly small minimum all mention of or reference to corruption, to the damage political corruption can create to the cause of economic and social progress, and of course political corruption is not confined to developing countries hence no doubt the awkwardness of a donor's representative who might have it in mind to expatiate on the problem. Even in high level conference dialogue there is inevitable hesitation for the pot to call the kettle black.

James Scott is to be congratulated for producing this study of corruption on a comparative basis, which carries one from the United States to Ghana and India, from Stuart England to present-day Thailand. In the author's words (in his Preface) "the perspective of this book is that corruption . . . must be understood as a regular, repetitive, integral part of the operation of most political systems". True enough, indeed all too true. But to suggest as the author does that corruption "far from being pathological . . . may actually represent channels of political demands without which formal societal arrangements could scarcely survive," is surely the philosophy of despair – for the author is surely not being cynical. Power corrupts, hence, as much as anything else, the lure and the century by century prevalence of political corruption. The lesson remains as before that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

CONFLICT ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION DECISIONS: THREE CASES, by YOUNG W. KIHL; *University of Denver, Colorado*; appendix, notes; pp. 96; $1.00.

Dr. Kihl studies the role of the International Civil Aviation Organization and examines three cases that were the cause of controversy before the Organization.

These cases were of considerable interest and importance. The first relates to the opposition of the Air Line Pilots Association to amendments made by the Council of ICAO to the standards of aircraft operation whereby North Atlantic air corridors were narrowed – a decision which the pilots challenged with at least temporary success, on the grounds of safety.

ICAO has, understandably, more responsibility in the field of air navigation than that of air transport. In the second case, a proposal that the organization should provide "origin and destination" statistics to member states was abandoned in the face of opposition apparently headed by France.

The third case relates to "air law and passenger liability limit" which originated with the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and which the United States "denounced" in 1966 – subsequently a compromise agreement was reached at Montreal which went far towards accepting the American position.

Neither the first nor the second case were argued as matters of international law, but all three are of considerable interest to students of international organizations.

Unfortunately Dr. Kihl's style lacks felicity, the booklet is full of abbreviations, and if jargon is largely avoided there is a certain coyness in the use of "actors" for the national representatives to whom he refers.

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS OF AFRICANA IN RHODES HOUSE LIBRARY, OXFORD, supplement completed by LOUIS B. FREWER; *Bodleian Library, Oxford*, 1971; 75p.

The 1968 *Manuscript Collections of Africana* has been reprinted and the opportunity taken to issue a supplement covering items received up to the end of 1970. A wide variety of material has been collated and for a long time to come Scholars and Africanists will find the Rhodes House Library an invaluable resource centre for original papers not only on anglo-phone Africa but on the whole continent.

SELECTED LETTERS OF HUBERT MURRAY, Ed. FRANCIS WEST; *Oxford University Press;* index; pp. 255; £3.75.

Dr. West, Hubert Murray's biographer,* has now prepared as a companion volume this collection of his letters. Hubert (the brother of Gilbert to whom many of these letters are addressed) went to New Guinea in 1904, became acting Administrator of Papua in 1907 and he was still in the saddle at Government House, Port Moresby when he died in 1940, a Colonial Governor nearing 80 years of age!

Appropriately the first entry, to his mother, he was not quite eight, reports a cricket match at Melbourne; the last, to his daughter, expresses a typically tolerant viewpoint about a granddaughter, a light hearted tale of a taboo and an indication that he was weary of the world and would not be likely to fight hard for life should he fall ill – as he did on his last journey on the following week, and he was dead within ten days.

Scholarly, perceptive, kindly-written letters, so often from scholar brother to scholar brother linking Oxford with a remote and primitive Pacific outpost, portray a liberal Colonial administrator, well in advance of his times in tolerant outlook. These letters make a very pleasant and worthwhile contribution to the literature of outposts, of interest to the general reader, the historian and the student alike.

* Reviewed by Dr. Scarr, JAO, Vol. VIII, July, 1969.

PATTERNS OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN, Ed. EMANUEL DE KADT; *Oxford University Press* for the Royal Institute of International Affairs; map, index; pp. 188; £3.50.

The essays in this volume were originally presented as papers at seminars held at Chatham House, when contributors from the New World and the Old, examined the prevalance of foreign influence in particular in Cuba, the French Antilles, Guatamala, Guyana, Jamaica and Surinam. Inevitably many islands and island groups are not discussed in any detail.

Attention is drawn to "the grave and disquieting growth of unemployment" and to the dangers in this context of capital intensive technology which the foreign investor may introduce. The overall picture that is drawn is not an encouraging one. Greater co-operation and/or economic integration often suggested as the ready answer to the problems of economic development, present particular difficulties. Even if some of the would-be partners seem to be getting cold feet about the Guyana initiative towards a new style of Caribbean Federation this at least would seem to offer one hopeful future prospect.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM IN GHANA,

Ed. G. B. Kay; *Cambridge University Press*; tables, maps, index; pp. 431; £8.60.

The author has carried out a major task. He presents more than forty documents under six chapter headings each with its own bibliography. He provides a major introduction to the volume and shorter introductory paragraphs to each chapter. Stephen Hymer has helped to provide over 100 pages of statistical abstracts. The first sixty years of the Twentieth Century are covered by the documents and statistics.

It is a pity that the author seems to have been content to follow the current popular fashion of denigrating the British effort wherever this may have taken place overseas. Unlike a very great many dependencies of the several colonial powers and unlike some other states that avoided dependency status, Ghana entered independence with a good bank balance and probably the best African Civil Service on the Continent. The production of this book must have involved a great deal of work, and the author is entitled to interpret as he chooses, the documents he has selected for publication. But one really has to wonder whether he has not arrogated over much to himself by the manner in which he passes judgment on economic, financial, agricultural, transport and educational matters. One must wonder whether this can possibly enhance the value of his scholarship.

AL-MANAR – AN ENGLISH-ARABIC DICTIONARY, by Hasan S. Karmi;

Longman, 1971; with plates and appendices; pp. 903; £3.00.

This handsome and well produced English-Arabic dictionary, with clear distinctive printing, provides over 900 pages for the very modest sum of three pounds only. In addition to the very full word list, a key to pronunciation, an abbreviations list, a guide to dictionary usage are among the additional useful items that are provided.